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-CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"The Suez Canal h~s been a blessing and a curse. Per-
haps since the digging of the Canal began in 1859 and after
its completion in 1869, it has been subjected to more con-
troversies than any other construction project in history...l
The Suez Canal, in Egyptian territory between the
Arabian Desert and the Siani peninsula, is an artificial
waterway 103 miles long, between Port Said on the Mediter-
ranean and Suez on the Red Sea. "Crossing the isthmus be-
tween Asia and Africa, the Canal's geographic location has
made its strategic value in international affairs greater
than that of any other maritime passage in the world. n2
Construction work, directed by the French engineer
Ferdinand de Lesseps, began on April 25, 1859 and the Canal
opened on November 17, 1869. The cost was 432,807,882
francs. 3 The construction was completed under a ninety-nine
year concession right, granted to de Lesseps by the Viceroy
of Egypt, who was under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Tur-
key in the then Ottoman Empire. The construction authorized
lSuez Canal (Cairo: U.A.R. Information Department),
p. 3.
2M• Fathalla El Khatib and Omar Z. Ghobashy, The Suez
Canal: Safe and Free Passage (New York: Arab Information
Center, 1960), p. 6. Cited hereafter, Khatib and Ghobashy,
Suez Canal.
3..Suez Canal,n Information Please Almanac. 1965, p. 680.
1
2de Lesseps to form a company, Companie Universelle du Canal
Maritime de Suez, to construct, maintain, and operate the
Canal. The capital of the company was to be offered for
subscription to all the people of the world. The director
was to be appointed by the Egyptian Government, from among
the company's shareholders. "Ten per cent of the net profits
were to go to the founders, 15 per cent to the Egyptian Gov-
ernment and 75 per cent to the shareholders. n4 "The company
itself was registered in Egypt, with head offices in Egypt
and administrative offices in Paris. Throughout its many
arrangements with successive Egyptian governments the canal
was always acknowledged to be an integral part of Egypt.,,5
France, though a major canal user, has been principally
concerned with the administrative and economic aspects of
the company. The stock of the company was owned by a quarter
of a million small investors. Britain, on the other hand,
was mainly interested in the security of the Canal, since it
represented the shortest and most economical route to India
and the East. The British Government owned 44 per cent of
the shares, and the British shipping represented 70 per cent
of all traffic. The Canal became, as Bismark said, "the
spinal column of the British Empire. n6 In the 1880's,
~hatib and Ghobashy, Suez Canal, p. 7.
5Terence Robertson, Crisis (New York: Atheneum, 1965),
preface xiii. Cited hereafter, Robertson, Crisis.
6Ibid., preface xiii.
3Egyptian nationalists revolted against Turkish domination
and the Viceroy asked Britain to station troops at key points
along the Canal to prevent it from being blocked. The
British troops remained for seventy-four years.
A convention of the major Canal-users met in Constan-
tinople in 1$$$ and signed an agreement that provided for the
guaranteed freedom of passage for all ships of all nations,
and the impartial use of it in both times of war and peace.
By the time the Ottoman pire had collapsed after World Var
I, Britain had become the official custodian of the Canal's
safety.
With the advent of thermonuclear v/eapons, far flung
bases, such as that at Suez, were rendered obsolete. In
1954, Britain and Egypt worked out an agreement under which
British troops would evacuate the Canal Zone by 1956. In
June of 1956, the last British troops pulled out, and on July
26, 1956, the Government of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal
Company, precipitating the Crisis that involved armed hostil-
ities toward Egypt on the part of our allies, and a split in
the Atlantic Alliance that has yet to be fully repaired.
Objectives of the Thesis
The objective of this thesis is to present the American
position in the fall of 1956, during the Suez Crisis, which
7Ibid., preface xiii-xiv.
bE
4
for twenty-one days held the world on the brink of iorld ar
III. This study explains American Foreign Policy, during
this critical period, in the vital area of the uncommitted
world, struggling between communism and capitalism.
The v~iter has undertaken this topic knowing full well
that this could not be a fully documented or definitive study
of the American position, since much of the material is of
a confidential nature and most of the documents are still clas-
sified. Nevertheless, the writer has attempted to be as fac-
tual as possible and has documented the evidence where possible.
Organization of the Thesis
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The first
chapter is an introduction. The second chapter deals with
the major events that led the United States to develop a
foreign policy for the Middle East, and how that foreign
policy led directly to our involvement in the crisis. Chapter
three is the core of the thesis, since this section discusses
in detail the actual policy followed during the course of the
crisis, from nationalization to the withdrawal of foreign
troops and the clearance of the Canal for passage. In
Chapter four there is a discussion of the aftereffects of
our policy, especially with regard to the Atlantic Alliance.
The final chapter consists of a summation of the problem and
conclusions drawn from our policy over Suez.
5Source of Research Data
The publications of the United States Government and
the memoirs and diaries of the men most closely involved
in the crisis are the principal and primary sources in this
study.
The secondary material used consisted mainly of books
and articles appearing in periodicals and newspapers. To
date, only one pUblished book is entirely devoted to the
American policy in the Suez Crisis and that is one by Herman
Finer, Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His
Diplomacy, which was published in 1964, and was used by this
writer as a guide to the complicated actions of the United
States, when forming its policy during the crisis.
The sources of material for this study are greatly re-
duced, because of the recent nature of the events. The
writer was unable to secure any materials from the Eisenhower
Library, in Abilene, Kansas, since their materials, publi-
cations, and documents are not available for research at this
time.
Inquiries to the Department of State, Washington D.C.,
resulted in a selected bibliography which has been a useful
aid in this study.
The major sources for this study were found in: New York
Public Library (42nd. Street Branch), Pittsburg Public Library,
Pittsburg, Kansas, and Porter Library, Kansas State College
of Pittsburg.
CHAPTER II
EVENTS LEADING TO THE ~mRICAN INVOLVEMENT
IN THE SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956
Certain events forced the United States to take an
active interest in the Middle East. The series of events,
however, involved the United States in the smoldering feud
between nationalism and colonialism which erupted in 1956
as the Suez Crisis. Another factor that influenced American
policy was a strong humanitarian feeling for world Jewry, that
complicated our efforts to establish a workable policy with
the Arab world.
Lack of Development of s United States' Foreign Policy
in the Middle East Following World War II
The Middle East, which is sometimes called the Near East,
is that group of nations consisting of Egypt, Syria, Iraq,
Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. NeighQoring states,
closely involved, are Turkey to the northwest, Iran (Persia)
to the northeast, and various coastal areas, like Kuwait, the
Bahrein Islands, and Libya. Within each of these Moslem
countries there can be found regions of extremely complicated
problems and passions. In 1947, a further irritant was added
to this area with the "solution" of the Palestine question
1
and the subsequent rise of the Jewish State of Israel.
lHerman Finer, Dulles Over Suez (Chicago: Quadrangle
Books, 1964), p. 11. Cited hereafter, Finer, Dulles.
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Geographically, the Middle East "is the natural meeting
place of three continents - Europe, Asia and Africa. In this
region converge the main intercontinental land routes and the
shortest water routes.' Control of the Near East, therefore,
has always beena prime requirement for world power. n2
In addition to its function as the central crossroads of
the world, the Middle East has the recent distinction of being
the world's richest petroleum center. This strategic value of
the region's oil reserves can, therefore, scarcely be over-
stated in this industrial age. 3
Until the first World War the American in-
terest in the Middle East was largely cultural.
American diplomacy concerned itself with the pro-
tection of American citizens and of their rights
to preach, to teach and to trade. American mis-
sionaries, though they made few conversions to
Christianity, had a significa~t and beneficial
influence in bringing Western thought, ideals, and
educational methods into the Middle East. They
made no small contribution to the growth of na-
tionalism. American opinion, periodically, ex-
pressed itself in favor of freedom and against
those governments which ignored and surpressed it.
The picture of America in the public mind, where
it existed at all, was of a benevolent but dis-
tant friend. As a government and a nation; however,
the United States took no stand and had no policy.4
2E. A. Speiser, The United States and the Near East
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952', p. 120.
Cited hereafter, Speiser, Near East.
3Ibid., p. 125.
4John C. camPbell! Defense of the Middle East - Problems
American Diplomacy New York: Harper & Bros., 1982),
29. Cited hereafter, Campbell, Middle East.
During the interwar period, American policy was es-
sentially confined to that of oil companies in search of
concessions. Aside from the nation~l concern to see that
American firms got their fair share of the promising busi-
ness, under the auspices of the "open door," Washington did
not formulate a national policy between the Western Europeans
and the increasingly restive people they ruled in the Middle
East. 5 The United States was content to let the European
powers rule their respective colonies as they saw fit.
The second world war brought the United States into
direct contact with I iddle Eastern Affairs. American troops,
supplies, and technical assistance flowed into the Middle
East as a result of the war emergency. By the end of the
war, "the United States found itself playing a major part,
by reason of its role as a leading Allied power, intent on
winning the war and laying the foundations for a stable
peace.,,6
While President Roo~evelt generally went along with
Churchill's plan to let Britain "play the hand" in the Middle
East, he nevertheless showed his interest in the future of
the Arab world, when he conferred with top Arab leaders in
the Canal Zone, following the Yalta Conference. When the
war ended, the United States found itself deeply immeshed
5Ibid., p. 30•
. 6Ibid ., p. 31.
9in world affairs and could not afford to return to its tra-
States were the vast financial interest American companies
contains vast natural resources • • •• • •
ditional policy of isolation.
American interests, in the Middle East, expanded rapidly
after the war.
First, in the event of another world war
America's physical survival itself might de-
pend on the strategic location of the M~iddle
East. The more bases the United States could
have scattered around the world, the less likely
it would be to suffer a complete knockout in
the first atomic strike by a hostile power.
From bases in the Middle East, America could
contain the U.S.S.R. and could assert a contin-
uous threat over her sources of oil in Baku and
Batmfi, as well as over all her major industrial
installations as far north as Leningrad and west
to the Urals. And, furthermore, the Middle East
was especially close to the soft underbelly of
Russia, soft in loyalty and soft
7
with her richest
harvests of grain - the Ukraine.
Other factors that increased the interest of the United
7Finer, Dulles, p. 12.
SSpeiser, Near East, p. 123, quoting speech by Truman,
April, 1946.
grave problems
among outside powers' which rivalry 'might suddenly erupt
into conflict,.nS
lies across the most convenient routes of land, air and water
communications ••• might become an area of intense rivalry
held in Middle Eastern oil concessions, and the possibility
of protecting the Suez Canal, through which most of the oil
had to be transported.
President Truman, in an Army Day address, in April of
1946, referred to the Middle East "as an area ~"lhich 'presents
10
While the United States had no ~ddle Eastern foreign
policy, as such, Soviet threats of expansion forced im-
mediate decisions on nWashington in 1947 to take a clear
stand on its political. and military commitments in the
northern belt of the Middle East and thus to define a new
frontier of American security.n9 Though these actions were
generally in line with those of Great Britain, the United
States was not just following the British lead, but was making
decisions on its own. Because of this, Anglo-American rela-
tions were not marked by complete harmony, especially when
American diplomatic forays occasionally clashed with the well
established colonial policy of the British system. lO
In assuming its role as a world leader, in such a
relatively short amount of time, American interests had de-
veloped so fast, and in such a revolutionary fashion, that a
clear appreciation of our commitment in the Middle East, with
all its implications, was not in evidence. Hence there
could be no purposeful policy to pursue, for it was as yet
unformed. II It was due to this lack of policy, and an in-
herited problem from Britain's Whitehall that the United
States became involved in a situation that turned the Arab
world against us and destroyed the possibility of extending
9George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, (1952), p. 426. Cited
hereafter, LenczowSki, Middle East.
10campbell, Middle East, p. 33.
11Speiser, Near East, p. 242.
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the influence of N.A.T.O. into the Middle East. This was
the rtsolutionU of the perennial crisis over Palestine.
The Creation of Israel and the Arab Reaction
In 1917, a hard pressed British government
issued the Balfour Declaration as a war measure
against the Central powers. This was a condi-
tional grant to establish a Jewish tthomelandtt
in Palestine without destroying either the
political or economic rights of the existing
Arab communities. In the years that followed
these limitations were whittled away.
The Jewish population in the Holy Land,
less than 50,000 at the turn of the century, in-
creased rapidly with the advent of Adolf Hitler,
and threatened the land's absorptive capacity
• • • • The ensuing three-way conflict between
the uncompromising Jewish nationalists who de-
manded a state, the Arab nationalists who in-
sisted on self-determination, and the Mandatory
Administration, led to illegal immigration,
violence, and sabotage. The British were caught
be~weenl~he fire of the two conflicting nation-
al~sms. ~
By the late forties the situation had become so tense that a
solution had to be found. America, like Britain, osten-
sibly sought a solution in Palestine that would safeguard the
rights of both the Arabs and the Jews. But a basic differ-
ence in approach, between the two Allied powers, prevented
any effective joint action. Britain was primarily concerned
with safeguarding its relations with the Arab world, and its
strategic and perilous hold on the Suez Canal. American
policy, while mindful of those considerations, reflected a
12Alfred M. Lilienthal, There Goes the Middle East
(New York: The Boohnailer, Inc., 1961), p. 3. Cited
hereafter, Lilienthal, Middle East.
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strong humanitarian feeling that a haven in Palestine (but
apparently nowhere else) must be opened to the persecuted
remnants of European Jewry. Coupled" with this was the not
inconsiderable pressure exerted by the Zionist organizations
that helped to mold this humanitarian policy. As a conse-
quence, neither London nor ~ashington, singly or together,
could develop an effective or consistent program to solve
the problem. 13
The very first American attempts at a solu-
tion ran up against insoluble dilemmas and against
a split in opinion at home, not only among the
public but between the authorities. The State
Department was opposed to President Truman when,
brushing aside moderation and compromise, he endorsed
on October 4, 1946, the Jewish Agency's claim to
a viable Jewish state in control of its own immi-
gration and economic policies, in an adequate
area of Palestine. 4
President Truman, in his own defense, wrote in his memoirs,
Years of Trial and Hope, that a little known feature of America's
Middle East policy was that:
Like most of the British diplomats, some of
our diplomats also thought that the Arabs, ,on
account of their numbers and because of the fact
that they controlled such immense oil resources,
should be appeased. I am sorry to say that there
were some among them who were also inclined to
be anti-Semitic. 15
In contrast, Truman's Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal,
13Campbell, Middle East, p. 35.
14Pierre Rondot, The Changing Patterns of the Middle
East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1902), p. 120.
Cited hereafter, Rondot, Changing Patterns.
15Harry S. Truman, (Memoirs) Years of Trial and Hope
(Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956) II, p. 164.
Cited hereafter, Truman, Trial and Hope.
13
noted in his diary, that our Palestine policy had been for
"squalid political purposes.n16 Thus the American contri-
bution to the difficult problem took the form of periodic
Presidential statements, that urged the admission of more
Jews to Palestine and private aid to immigration, all of
which irked Britain and only added to the local pressures in
Palestine itself. 17
By the spring of 1947, the British decided to place the
controversy over Palestine before the United Nations. The
United Nations formed a committee to study the problem and
finally produced a partition plan for Palestine, which passed
in the General :Assembly by a vote of thirty-three to sixteen,,
(U.s., U.S.S.R. and France voted for, Britain abstained)
on November 29, 1947. The Plan, in general, called for an
end to the mandate and for Jerusalem to be placed under per-
manent international trusteeship; the establishment of two
separate states, one Jewish and one Arab, both to be indepen-
dent, though linked economically. Each state was to consist
of three distinct sections of land, connected by precarious
corridors. lS
l6Walter E. Mills (ed.) The Forrestal Diaries (New
York: The Viking Press, 1957), p. 508. Cited hereafter,
Mills, Forrestal.
l7Campbell, Middle East, p. 36.
18Report on Palestine. A Report to the General Assembly
by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (New
York: Somerset Books, Inc., 1947), full text of recommenda-
tions, p. 137-211.
14
The Jews readily accepted the plan but the Arab states
rejected the plan and the American government was forced to
acknowledge the inability to enforce this international
attempt at a solution,. where upon the Jews criticised the
government for shirking its responsibility, to the be-
leaguered Jews of Palestine. 19
"If criticism of the United States is in order; it is
not because this country imposed her will on others but
rather because the government was not itself clear as to
what to do. n20
"The British reached the conclusion that the best thing
for them \'las to wi thdrm'l from Palestine. This they did and
there appeared to be some danger that by creating a vacuum
so suddently a state of anarchy would ensue."21 The Jews of
Palestine, however, were prepared to take action. At mid-
night, .on May ~4, 1948, the time the British mandate ended,
the new Jewish state of Israel proclaimed its independence.
Eleven minutes later, President Truman announced to the press,
through his press secretary, the de facto recognition of the
provisional government of· Israel. 22 (The U.S.S.R. gave it
de jure recognition on rJlay 17., 1949). American foreign policy
19Rondot, Changing Patterns, p. 120
20Speiser, Near East, p. 224.
21Emil Lengyel, The Changing Middle East (New York:
The John Day Company, 1960), p. 47. Cited hereafter,
Lengyel, Middle East.
'22Truman , Trial and Hope, p. 164.
15
had t~cen its first major stand in the Middle East.
nOn May 15 the Arab armies of Lebanon, Syria, Trans-
Jordan, Iraq and Egypt invaded Palestine with the intent of
driving the Jews into .the sea. The Arab-Israel war had
begun.n23 On the surface the Arabs, who had numbered nearly
forty million, as opposed to the only one million Jews in
Israel, should have easily destroyed the Jewish State, how-
ever, the Arab governments could not resolve their own dif-
ferences, despite a common objective. The course of the Arab-
Israeli war created astonishment everywhere. The Israeli
Army was able to check and repel the forces of the Arab
League in almost every engagement, which resulted in a gen-
eral stalemate that the United Nations expanded into a shaky
truce.
The outcome of the Arab-Israeli war was twofold. First,
under fire, Israel had asserted her right to exist as a
nation and would have to be considered a factor in all mat-
ters of Middle East import in the future. Another important
feature of the war was the fact that Israel occupied more
territory at the end of the war than it had by the partition
plan of 1947, and it remained under the control of Israel
even after the armistice agreements between Israel and the
23Harry B. Ellis, Israel and the Middle East (New York:
The Ronald Press Co., 1957), p. 115. Cited hereafter, Ellis,
Israel.
16
contiguous Arab states. 24
The Arab states were forced to resign themselves to the
existence of Israel but they refused to recognize it, and
considered their defeat only a temporary one. They also
never forgave America for standing god-father for the Jewish
state. 25
The probl~m of 500,000 Arab refugees, forced from Israel
by the war, further accentuated the split between Israel and
her Moslem neighbors. The concomitant of the Jewish victory
was the rise of Arab nationalism. The failure of the Arabs
in the Palestine war inflamed internal revolutions through-
out the Moslem world, that erupted in several countries, whose
import and extent was only gradually realized.
In 1949, the Syrian army, in a bloodless coup d'etat,
ousted the established government. In 1952, a revolution
occurred in Egypt and swept away a corrupt monarchy and ruling
aristocracy.
These tremors in the vast and fabulous land
of Egypt did more than Syria's confusing coup
to start the invisible crumbling of the Middle
East. • • • Waves of unrest, the prelude of the
Middle East's internal revolution, spread from
the Baghdad populace (on the move since November
1952) to the Arab refugees (always in ferment)
and the budding proletariats bunched round the
oil installations and preparing the ground for
24Halford L. Hoskins, The Middle East (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1954), p. 107. Cited hereafter, Hoskins,
Middle East.
25Rondot, Changing Patterns, p. 122.
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the first strikes on the shores of the Persian
Gulf. Such was the fruit of the Palestine drama
of 1948 which had been the first cause of the
military risings against the rule of the ~riv­
ileged and against government by pashas. 2b
The Americans were cast, as the imperialists who grafted
Israel to the Middle East, and who incorrectly judged the
vital importance of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Arabs
noted the vast financial assistance Israel received, in
comparison to their own shares, and noted that for allowing
American air bases, within their own nation, they received
less aid than did Israel, a country that had no such bases.
They concluded, therefore, that the United States was only
interested in establishing themselves in the Mdddle East,
in view of a possible war against the Soviet Union.
The American government dispersed its effort in various
forms and proceeded from one contradiction to another.
They disappointed the Jews and offended the Arabs. Thus,
the lack of an established American policy, in the light of
America's position in the world, must be counted,as one of
the principal factors in the failure of the west to bring
peace and stability to the Near East. 27
In 1950, the Western powers (France, Great Britain, and
the United States) attempted to put an end to this chaos,
by the issuance of the tripartite declaration.
26Ibid., p. 129-130.
27Ibid., p. 132-134.
18
The Beginning of ~ American Policy ill the Middle East
The tripartite declaration was made necessary because the
conclusion of the Arab-Israeli armistice, in 1949, had not led
to a formal peace settlement. Britain's resumption of arms
shipments, in accord with its treaty obligations to Egypt,
Iraq, and Jordan, was accompanied by widespread talk in the
Middle East of a "second round" against Israel. Israel, on
the other hand, continued to maintain a state of alert and
purchased military equipment whenever she could. A minia-
ture arms race had developed. The tripartite statement was
intended to stress, to the governments concerned, that the
Western powers would not tolerate any renewal of the Arab-
Israeli war. 28 The declaration was worded as follows:
The Governments of the United Kingdom, France,
and the United States, having had occasion during
the recent Foreign Ministers meeting in London to
review certain questions affecting the peace and
stability of the Arab states and of Israel, and
particularly that of the supply of arms and war ma-
terial to these states, have resolved to make the
following statements:
1. The three Governments recognize that the
Arab states and Israel all need to maintain a cer-
tain level of armed forces for the purposes of
assuring their internal security and their legiti-
mate self-defense and to permit them to play their
part in the defense of the area as a whole. All
applications for arms or war material for these
countries will be considered in the light of these
principles. In this connection the three Govern-
28J • C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle
East A Documentary Record: 1914-1956 (Princeton: D. Van
Nostrand and Company, Inc., 1956), pg. 308. Cited here-
after, Hurewitz, Diplomacy.
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ments wish to recall and reaffirm the terms of
the statements made by .their representatives on
the Security Council 0 August 4, 1949, in which
they declared their opposition to the development
of an arms race between the Arab states and Israel.
2. The three Governments declare that assur-
ances have been received from all the states in
question, to which they permit arms to be supplied
from their countries, that the purchasing state
does not intend to undertake any act of aggression
against any other state. Similar assurances will
be requested from any other state in the area to
which they permit arms to be supplied in the
future.
3. The three Governments take this opportunity
of declaring their deep interest in and their de-
sire to promote the establishment and maintenance
of peace and stability in the area and their un-
alterable opposition to the use of force or threat
of force between any of the states in that area.
The three Governments, should they find that any
of these states was preparing to violate frontiers
or armistice lines, would, consistently with their
obligations, as members of the United Nations,
immediately take action, both within and outsid~
the United Nations, to prevent such violation.2~
This statement was issued on May 25, 1950.
The tripartite declaration, while sound in its concern
for the preservation of peace and stability in the Middle
East, annoyed the Arab states. They rejected it'on June 21,
1950, on the grounds that it implied Arab recognition of
Israel, and might harm their sovereignty and independence. 30
As a Palestine affair continued to remain in a crisis
stage, the cold war between East and West broke into open
29Department of State Bulletin, (June 5, 1950), p. 886.
30Hurewitz, Diplomacy, p. 311.
PORTER lIBRAR~
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hostilities in Korea. Many American, and Western European
officials, viewed this willingness to resort to open aggres-
sion as a possible first in a series of steps by the Communists
to destroy, by the use' of force, vulnerable countries of the
free world. America, besides stopping them in Korea, would
have to build a network of defensive alliances around the
periphery of the Communist bloc. 3l "The glaring weakness of
the Middle East seemed almost an open invitation to aggres-
sion. To Washington and to London the pressing need to do
something about organizing a more solid defense there was
clear."32
The Western search, for ways to strengthen their posi-
tion in the Middle East, quickly gained momentum. While
British power \"'1as shrinking, the overriding strategic pro-
blem at the time was to keep the Suez Canal, and its bases,
within the Allied orbit. The United States, therefore, took
the initiative in persuading Britain, France, and Turkey to
join an allied Middle East Command. 33 The idea was to es-
tablish a purely military command, since an alliance like
the North Atlantic Pact was impossible under the present un-
settled conditions. It was unfortunate that this proposal
was presented in 1951, a year when nationalistic manifestations
31Campbell, Middle East, p. 38.
32Ibid., p. 38.
33Hurewitz, Diplomacy, p. 329.
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against the vest were extremely strong. Iran nationalized
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the Arab-Israeli dispute
had brought a number of serious border clashes, plus the
fact that the Egyptian' government demanded the British get
out of Suez, leaving no room for compromise. It had been
hoped that the Middle East command would pacify the Egyptian
feelings somewhat, by substituting an international force,
to replace the purely British forces already stationed there.
However, the allied powers did not consult the Egyptian gov-
ernment, in formulating its plans, which was an affront to
the Egyptian nationalistic sensitivities. It was in this
highly charged situation that the Four-Powers seized the
opportunity to present their proposal to Egypt. What they
failed to realize was that "in the final analysis, the estern
powers and Egypt were at cross purposes. The allies were
anxious to bolster their defenses against the USSR; Egypt
to rid itself of foreign controls."3~
The American govern~ent and its allies had, ,once again,
completely misread the Arab feeling in the Middle East.
~gypt immediately rejected membership in 'the Comraand. The
Arab world, for its part, denounced the defense plan as ~~
imperialist alliance to partition the entire Middle East, and
called on the Americans and British to choose between the
friendship of the Jews or the frienqship of the Arabs.
34Ibid., p. 329.
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To the Arabs, the dominant issues were Israel and
Imperialism. The Arab world was basically pan-arab and not
interested in choosing sides in the overall East-'iest struggle.
The Westen1 powers, for some reason, could not conceive this
fact. Between 1951 and 1952, the United States and Great
Britain continued their attempts to graft a defense organi-
zation on the Middle East without solving any of its political
problems. ttIf anything could be concluded by American policy-
makers from the experience of those years, it was that the
old roads led nowhere a~d that some new approach would have
to be tried. tt35
The newly elected Republican administration came into
office in 1953 and promptly began to formulate a new approach
policy. The new look began with Secretary of State, John
Foster Dulles, spending two and one-half weeks (11-28 May,
1953) in the Middle East, on a fact finding mission. Upon
his return to the United States, Secretary Dulles reported
to the American people his findings via nationwi~e radio and
television, and laid down the new policy that the United States
would pursue in the Arab world. His conclusions were that:
rost of the peoples of the Near East and
South Asia are deeply concerned about political
independence for themselves and others. They are
suspicious of the colonial powers. The United
States too is suspect because, it is reasoned,
our NATO alliance with France and Britain re-
quired us to try to preserve or restore the old
colonial interests of our allies••••
35Campbell, Middle East, p. 49.
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The United States should seek to allay the
deep resentment against it that has resulted from
the creation of Israel. • • •
Today the Arab peoples are afraid that the
United States will back the new State of Israel
in aggressive expansion. They are more fearful
of Zionism than of communism, and they fear lest
the United States become the backer of expan-
sionist Zionism.
On the other hand, the Israeli fear that
ultimately the Arabs may try to push them into
the sea.
In an effort to calm these contradictory
fears the United States joined with Britain and
France in a Declaration of May 25, 1950, Tripar-
tite. • • • It must be made clear that the present
U. S. administration stands fully behind that
Declaration. • • • United States policies should
be impartial so as to win not only the respect
and regard of the Israeli but also of the Arab
peoples. We.shall seek such policies••••
A Middle East Defense Organization isa
future rather than an immediate possibility.
hile awaiting the formal creation of a
security association, the United States can use-
fully help strengthen the interrelated defense of
those countries which Wro1t strength, not as against
each other or the West, but to resist the cormnon
threat to all free peoples.
In conclusion, let me recall that the 'primary
purpose of our trip was to show friendliness and
to develop understanding. These peoples we vis-
ited are proud peoples who have a great tradition
and, I believe, a great future. ~e in the United
States are better off if we respect and honor
them. It profits nothing merely to be critical
of others.
President Eisenhower's administration plans
to make friendship-ngt faultfinding-the basis of
its foreign policy.3
36Department of State Bulletin, (June 15, 1953), p. 831-35.
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Based on the findings of his trip, the
strategy of Mr. Dulles gradually began to take
form: Settle the Suez problem, while preventing
any exacerbation of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
and contribute to the stability of the area by
limited expenditures for military and economic
aid. And becaus~ he had.also learned that defen-
sive measures could not be imposed on the Middle
East states from the outside, the Secretary
turned his efforts toward building a different
type of defense wall around the area. 37
In Cairo, Secretary Dulles had learned that the general
Arab feeling leaned toward neutralism, being similar in that
respect to India, but that the Arab states of the northern
tier, along the Soviet borders, were most aware of the Soviet
menace, and it was here that he decided to concentrate his
efforts for the defense of the Middle East. "The northern
tier concept seemed to offer the opportunity to strengthen
those nations that wanted to be strengthened, without per-
mitting troublesome problems like Suez and Palestine to hold
up progress where it could be made. n 38
One further circumstance was crucial in determining
America's future in the Middle East. Arab feeling was vehe-
ment against the last vestiges of colonialism, mainly British,
which remained in the region. Therefore, it became Dulles'
policy to press the British to evacuate their Suez Canal Zone
base.
From the beginning of his policy, it is apparent that
Secretary Dulles was especially anxious to give Egyptian
37Lilienthal, Middle East, p. 72.
38Campbell, Middle East, p. 50.
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politicians a reason to bring Egypt into his overall plans
for a Northern Tier Alliance. He had set out to win over the
military junta leader, General Naguib, with small but gracious
acts. One of these included the presentation of a pearl-
handled revolver inscribed: "To General Naguib from his
friend Dwight D. Eisenhower. u39
Dulles continued to woo Egypt, while continuing to press
fOfi~ard with his Northern Tier program in other countries.
The cornerstone of any such alignment would have to be Turkey,
easily the strongest state in the Middle East and a member of
N.A.T.O. The Turks, natural enemies of Russia for centuries,
were anxious to see such an alignment take place in order to
protect their eastern flank from a possible Soviet invasion.
By the end of 1953 the Eisenhower administration con-
cluded plans to sell arms to Pakistan with the understanding
that Pakistan would cooperate in a regional defense. In April
1954, this plan was implemented when an agreement of friendly
cooperation was signed between Pakistan and Turkey. While it
had the markings of Dulles' Northern Tier Alliance stamped
allover it, this agreement did not bear the open stigma of
western participation. By this measure it was hoped other
Arab states would feel free to join in this mutual alliance
pact. The next logical move, for Secretary Dulles, was to
link the Pakistan-Turkey alliance with a land bridge, since
39Finer, Dulles, p. 14-16.
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Pakistan and Turkey are not adjacent to one another. The
nation chosen to fulfill this need was Iraq.
The United States qUickly concluded an arms agreement
with Iraq, by which Iraq would receive both military and
technical assistance, »solely to maintain its internal secu-
rity and its legitimate self defense, and that it will not
undertake any act of aggression against any other state.»40
The "new look" policy of the Republican administration
\'\Tas taking effect, and in two years Secretary Dulles had
placed the United States directly in the forefront of for-
mulating a defensive network, without disturbing the status-
quo of the Arab situation, and by his impartial attitude in
the Arab-Israeli dispute, was winning friends. The arms
deal with Iraq paved the way for the eventual formation of
the Baghdad Pact. It further showed how quickly Secretary
Dulles was able to develop a foreign policy in the Near East,
that was acceptable to all sides.
The Growth of American Foreign Policy
While the Northern Tier program began to take shape,
the United States continued to encourage Eygpt to join the
new alliance.
The Americans, convinced of the importance
of Egypt (even more so after the coup of 1952)
wanted to make it the Middle Eastern centre of
their defense system and so greatly expand this
40Hurewitz, Diplomacy, p. 346-347.
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system in depth. They therefore urged the
British to make substantial political conces-
sions to Egypt and withdraw their troops in
order to pave the way for reconciliation with
the West•••• 41 .
In Egypt itself, General Naguib was replaced as Premier
by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, the behind the scenes power
in the revolution. Nasser, a fiery nationalist and political
genius, from the beginning of his reign, was a man of action.
He cleared the way for serious negotiations on a settlement
of the Canal base issue, by taking a conciliatory attitude
into the discussions with the British. 42 As a result of
this attitude, and continuing pressure from the United States,
plus the increasing evidence that even the strongest military
base would be of questionable value, if surrounded by a bit-
terly hostile population, the British were forced to enter
into serious negotiations with Egypt. 43
An agreement was reached on October 19, 1954. The major
point agreed upon was that all British forces would be com-
pletely withdrawn and that both parties would uphold the 1888
Convention guaranteeing freedom of navigation of the Canal.
(The right of passage in the Canal did not include Israeli
shipping, which had been prohibited from the Canal, a clear
4lRondot, Changing Patterns, p. 138.
42William F. Longgood, Suez Story: Key to the Middle
East (New York: Greenberg, 1957), p. 120. Cited hereafter,
Longgood, Suez Story.
43Charles D. Cremeans, The Arabs and the World: Nasser's
Arab Nationalist Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963),
p. 139. Cited hereafter, Cremeans, Nasser's Policy.
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violation of the 1 88 Constantinople Convention, but no men-
tion is made of it in this treaty). Anthony Eden wrote of
this agreement in his Memoirs:
This agreement was a declaration of conven-
ience for Britain and Egypt. Neither country
wanted the eXisting state of affairs to continue.
The agreement's most serious weakness was not
recognized by many at the time. Egypt still
proclaimed herself at war with Israel and there
was nothing in the clauses to limit or restrain
future Egyptian ambitions, except a reaffirmation
of the freedom of the Suez Canal. Nor were thene
any evident reasons for insisting on this. The
hope was rather that Anglo-American co-operation,
strengthened by the agreement, could work more
effectively for improved relations between Israel
and the Arab states. During the next twelve months
our two Governments plodded steadily after schemes
to that end. I did not then forsee the extent
of Egyptian expansionist aims over other Arab
states, nor the growing menace which Egyptiffi1 words
~~d acts, such as the fedayeen raids, would
later bring upon Israel. It is probable that the
absence of British forces from the canal zone,
however circumscribed they had been, facilitated
aggressive Egyptian activities, both
49
vert and
covert, against her neighbors •••• 4
On November 7, 1954, the United States granted forty
million dollars to Egypt to further her economic progress after
having encouraged Egypt to conclude the Suez agreement. 45
~ith the conclusion of the Suez base agreement, the
United States and Britain hoped that the Egyptian leaders
would cooperate with the West, for the defense of the Middle
East. In the Western minds, the agreement was a formulation
44Anthon; Eden, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Full Circle
(Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1960), p. 289-290. Cited
hereafter, Eden, Full Circle.
45Cremeans, Nasser's Policy, p. 140.
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of the old alliance idea. For the Egyptian Government however,
the agreement was simply a means to expedite the withdrawal
of foreign troops. The Egyptian Government, therefore, was
not willing to trade its newly found independence for a
ready-made foreign policy. If there was to be such an alli-
ance at all, it would have to be on terms acceptable to an
independent Egypt. 46
Since the Suez Base agreement did not provide a basis
for an area defense arrangement, the British and American
governments continued to search for a formula which would
provide this objective of Western policy. From the very
start, it is reported Secretary Dulles disliked associating
United States' policy with that of Britain, in the Middle
East, because he considered Britain's approach to the area
contained the stain of colonialism. 47
On January 12, 1955, the Government of Iraq announced
its decision to conclude an alliance with Turkey, which had
already concluded a treaty with Pakistan; bringing the
northern tier concept close to realization. This alliance
became known as the Baghdad Pact. The Eisenhower Adminis-
tration presented the Pact to the American public "as a
46Dwight D. ~isenhower, Mandate for Change 1953-1956
(Garden City: DOUbleday and Company, 1963), p. 427. Cited
hereafter, Eisenhower, Mandate.
47Roscoe Drummund and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink:
John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power (Garden City:
Doubleday and Company, 1960), p. 148. Cited hereafter,
Drummund and Coblentz, Duel at the Brink.
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bold, imaginative action, braintrusted in Washington and
executed by America's allies. It was depicted as forging
'a ring of steel' around the borders of the Communist
world. n4$
Iraq's association with the Baghdad Pact had explosive
consequences which were to shape and turn the subsequent
policy of Arab affairs and external policy. The Egyptian
regime quickly responded to Iraq's challenge to its leader-
ship of the Arab world. All the resources of Egyptian pro-
paganda, diplomacy, contacts, and personal prestige were
thrown into battle against Iraq's decision. Nasser attempted
to rally Arab nationalist sentiment against Iraq, for vio-
lating the solidarity of the Arab League, and warned other
Arab states that the alliance was not against their real
enemy, Israel, but was instead with the creators and sup-
porters of Israel's existence, the Western Powers. 49
Iraq stuck by its decision and answered Nasser's pro-
paganda barrage with its own, but no other Arab ~tates
joined the Pact, save for Pakistan, which already had an
alliance with Turkey, and Iran which joined for defensive
purposes. When Great Britain became the only Western power
to join the Pact, it assumed the responsibility for the
direction and assistance given to the members. The United
States, while refusing to join the Pact, did offer moral
4$Ibid., p. 147.
49Cremeans, Nasser's Policy, p. 141.
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support to its members. Anthony Eden, would write in later
years, on America's refusal to join the Baghdad Pact:
In recent years the United- States has some-
times failed to put its weight behind its friends,
in the hope of being popular with their foes.
The practical consequences of this uncertain di-
plomacy are illustrated by United States treat-
ment of the Baghdad Pact. Having played a leading
part to inspire the project, the United States
Government held back while Britain alone of the
Western powers joined it. - orse still, they
tried to take credit for this attitude in capi-
tals like Cairo, which were hostile to the Pact.
Then, by a series of hesitant steps, they drew
nearer the Pact, sending an observer and spending
money, but still not joining it. An ounce of
membership would have been worth all the havering
and saved a ton of trouble later on. 50
In addition he wrote:
Anglo-American policies towards Egypt on the
other hand were at this time closely in accord. •
We agreed that the future of our policy in the
Middle East depended to a considerable extent
on Nasser. If he showed himself willing to
co-operate with us, we should reciprocate•••• 51
• •
The estern powers, though Nasser attacked the Baghdad
Pact, looked forward to an era of cooperative relations with
Egypt. The United States had already given forty,million
dollars in economic aid, after the agreement on Suez, and
was prepared to give some military assistance under the
mutual assistance progrmn. The Americans set out to win
Nasser's confidence and put relations on the very soundest
basis.
50Eden, Full Circle, p. 374-375.
51Ibid., p. 374.
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Prime Minister Nasser, however, was not rushing into any
close relationships with the iest. while he accepted American
economic aid, he turned dO·fln military aid because it included
the sending of American military advisory groups into Egypt
to supervise its use. This made the terms unacceptable, be-
cause the Egyptian people needed time to get used to independ-
ence and freedom from foreign occupation.
Events, rather than waiting for an Egyptian alliance with
the ~est, soon forced Egypt to make some crucial decisions
and establish a policy toward the West. 52
Deterioration of U. S.-Egyptian Relations
On February 28, 1955, Israeli army units attacked Egyp-
tian military installations in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli
forces killed thirty-eight persons and wounded thirty-one.
This was the first reprisal raid against Egyptian controlled
territory and called for an immediate and drastic response.
The United Nations Security Council quickly condemned
Israel for their actions, but this act increased domestic
pressures in Egypt for the government to take military action.
The Revolutionary Command Council, Egypt's governing body,
became desperate because it realized that any such action would
be disasterous for ~gypt, in the light of Israel's military
strength. 53
52Campbell, Middle East, p. 68.
53E• H. Hutchinson, Violent Truce: Arab Israeli Conflict
1251-1955 (New York: The Devlin Adair Company, 1956), p. 119.
C~ted hereafter, Hutchinson, Violent Truce.
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The Israeli raid exposed Egyptian military weakness
and no one realized this better than President Nasser.
Nasser countered the Gaza raid and the Western Alliance
proposal, with the formulation of an Arab approach to
foreign policy. The approach chosen was that of neutralism,
a program that later became known as positive neutralism and
Nasser adopted it to the frame of Arab nationalism. "Neu-
tralism was put to service in the cause of Egyptian nation-
alism and the U.S.S.R. was the first to benefit. n53
President Nasser next turned to the problem of securing
arms to defend Egypt and secure its borders from Israeli
attacks. Egypt first turned to the United States for military
equipment, but again would not agree to conditions required
of all recipients under the mutual security program. This
resulted in a long delay, until finally the United States
agreedm sell some of the necessary equipment to Egypt, only
under the condition that payment be made in dollars, which
Egypt could not spare.
Infuriated at the delays in Washington, Nasser turned
to the Soviet bloc and SUddenly concluded a deal for large
quantities of arms in return for bartered Egyptian cotton.
The announcement was made public by Nasser on September 27,
1955. Although they had had unofficial warning of the im~
pending deal:
53Rondot, Changing Patterns, p. 142.
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The actual arms deal hit Dulles and other
State Department officials with the force of a
thunderbolt, in spite of previous rumors. It
was humiliating to be outsmarted. It was a blow
that kindly and considerate action toward Egypt
had met with ingratitude and contempt and de-
rision. In one single stroke, in one adept
thrust, the Soviet Union had vaulted over the
Baghdad Pact, over the Northern Tier of coun-
tries, and after centuries of unsuccessful
effort had jumped, brazen and powerful, plumb
into the Middle East.54
While the arms deal was unsettling, to say the least,
the United States at this time was more concerned with the
health of its President, who had suffered a heart attack on
September 23, 1955, and did not immediately respond to the
news from Egypt. The first official statement came from
Secretary Dulles, in a news conference, on October 4, 1955.
During the course of this statement, Mr. Dulles made two ob-
servations. The first was that the Arab states, as independ-
ent nations, had every right to do whatever they wished in
the matter. Secondly, from the standpoint of the United States,
Soviet delivery of arms threatened the peace and stability
of the area. 55 After issuing this statement, Secretary Dulles:
Considered the harsh realities which con-
spired to thwart his plans to contain Communism,
and reevaluated the advice he was getting from
Henry Byroade, the United States Ambassador in
Cairo, and from George Allen, Assistant Under
Secretary in charge of Near Eastern Affairs at
54Finer, Dulles, p. 28.
55Paul E. Zinner, Documents on American Foreign Rela-
tions 1955 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), p. 355-356.
Cited hereafter, Zinner, Documents.
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the State Department. 56
Byroade and Allen believed the best pdicy for the United
States could be served by acts of friendship toward Nasser
and Arab nationalism•. Among these friendship gestures might
be the financing of the Aswan High Dam project. The Aswan
High Dam project, if it could be constructed, was pictured
by Nasser as the rational step to revolutionize the Egyptian
standard of living. Two million acres of new land could be
irrigated, and a limitless amount of electricity could be
generated. It could relieve the economy, by helping to in-
dustrialize northern Egypt, and relieve unemployment problems.
When completed, it would balance the Egyptian economy and,
for this reason, was one of Nasser's biggest ambitions. The
cost, however, was staggering, much greater than Eg¥pt could
ever afford. Nasser realized he needed outside help for such
an ambitious project and began sounding out the World Powers
on the possibility of receiving help for the proposed Aswan
The United States Government, in 1955, was interested
in the project in hopes, that in providing such an expression
of America's friendship, it would check Egypt's drift toward
the Soviet bloc. On this account, Sherman Adams, Presidential
Assistant, wrote:
When Dulles first discussed the proposed
financing of the Aswan Dam at a meeting with
56Robertson, Crisis, p. 18.
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the leaders of both parties in Congress, Lyndon
Johnson questioned the need for large amounts of
economic aid for Egypt. Dulles told the Demo-
cratic leader of the Senate that the grant-loan
arrangement under consideration would make it
unlikely that Egypt would change her affiliation
with us for the 'next ten years.57
In December of 1955, the United States Government de-
cided to go ahead with an offer of fifty-six million dollars,
as an initial grant on the project. Britain would contribute
fourteen million and the World Bank would loan an additional
two hundred million dollars.
At this juncture Nasser appeared to have triumphed.
The policy of neutralism was opening new fields to Egypt, arms
from the Soviet bloc to fight Israel and at the same time
financing was offered for the projected Dam. Egypt stood on
the threshold of a brilliant political future with no strings
attached. 58
Nasser, however, failed to grasp the opportunity. He
balked at the American proposal, especially where it called
for no side deals with the Russians. Nasser helq up the
negotiations for several months, while he thought about the
terms. He further showed his scorn for the West, when he
announced Egypt's recognition of Red China, and continued a
build-up of his military forces on the Israeli borders. He
57Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1961), p. 248. Cited hereafter, Adams, Report.
58Sidney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 630. Cited hereafter, Fisher,
Middle East.
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denounced the British and French for refusing to recognize
nationalist movements in Cyprus and Algeria, and he tried
once again to break up the Baghdad Pact. 59
Nasser, evidently did not understand the principles of
capitalism, because while the Western allies could stand the
verbal abuses, they also noted that arms shipments and the
subsequent payments of Egyptian revenues, were rapidly de-
pleting Egypt's financial resources. This was significant
to the West, because it would make the Aswan project more
of a liability than it had when the offer was originally
made, in December of 1955. It was not possible to get Nasser
to understand that the loan was economic, rather than solely
political, and that the conditions also went along with
necessary financial cautions.
Dulles did not hurry the loan along, the offer had been
made and it was up to Cairo to make its decision. While
Nasser delayed and continued to attack the West, and mortgage
the economy to the Soviet bloc, the United State~ began to
reassess its offer.
PUblic opposition began to snowball against the loan to
Egypt. Sherman Adams stated: nIt was extremely doubtful if
the President could have obtained Congressional approval of
the grants and loans to the Egyptians at that point had he
asked for them. n60
59Adams, Report, p. 249.
60Ibid., p. 249.
The moment Cairo became aware of these signs of a shift-
ing American policy, the Egyptian Ambassador hurried back to
Washington to accept the offer of the loan from the consortium
of the United States, Britain, and the World Bank.
On the afternoon of Thursday, July 19, 1956, Secretary
Dulles asked the Egyptian Ambassador, Mr. Ahmed Hussein, to
come to the State Department. When he arrived, Mr. Dulles
,
announced the withdrawal of the United States offer to help
finance the High Dam project at Aswan. ~~. Hussein hurried
back to his office to telephone his government in Cairo. He
was too late, the Government already knew. Mr. Dulles, con-
trary to diplomatic practices, had communicated a statement
of the American withdrawal to the Press, before he notified
the government concerned. 61 The press release from the State
Department, in part, read:
Developments within the succeeding 7 months
have not been favorable to the success of the
project, and the U.S. Government has concluded
that it is not feasible in present circumstances
to participate inthe project. Agreement by the
riparian states has not been achieved, and the
ability of Egypt to devote adequate resources to
assure the project's success has become more un-
certain than at the time the offer was made.
This decision in no way reflects or involves
any alteration in the friendly relations of the
Government and people of the United States toward
the Government and people of Egypt.
61Paul ,Johnson, The Suez War (New York: Greenberg,
1947), p. 1. Cited hereafter, Johnson, Suez War.
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The United States remains deeply interested
in the welfare of the Egyptian people and in the
development of the Nile. It is prepared to con-
sider at an appropriate time and at the request
of the riparian states what steps might be taken
toward a more effective utilzation of the water
resources of the. Nile for the benefit of the
peoples of the region. Furthermore, the United
States remains ready to assist Egypt in its
efforts to improve the economic condition of its
people and is prepared, through its appropriate
agencies, to discuss these matters within the 62
context of funds appropriated by the Congress.
As a result of the American decision, the World Bank also
cancelled its loan, which was interdependent with the United
States' loan; Britain followed suit and withdrew its offer of
financial aid on the project.
The manner in which the offer was with-
dr~~, to the accompanyment of a statement
saying the ability of Egypt to devote adequate
resources to assure the project's success, even
with the projected outside financing, had be-
come more uncertain, was taken by Abdel Nasser
as an attempt to humiliate him and his country.
He certainly overplayed the 'insulting' char-
acter of the statement, b~t that a clear re-
buff was intended can hardly be doubted, for
Washington might have continued to delay and to
point out obstacles still to be surmounted.
That it was the first clear manifestation of a
new American attitude toward Egypt was alsd
apparent, one which took more account of the
resentment of Turkey and other pro-Western states
that Egypt was getting more from the United
Stateg
3
for being naughty than they did for being
good.
Nasser's reply, to the Anglo-American action, was to
catch the world by surprise and deal a mortal blow to the
62Department of State Bulletin, (July 30, 1956),
p. 1$$.
63Campbell, Middle East, p. 75.
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hope of Egypti~1 cooperation with the West. Nasser seized
the Canal and nationalized the Canal Company.
CHAPTER III
M4ERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS
The seizure of the Canal Company, by the Egyptian Govern-
ment, and its worldwide effects, nearly precipitated World
War III. The actions of the United States Government, in
dealing with this crisis, and the policy that followed, is
the focal point of this chapter.
Egypt Seizes the Canal
The Anglo-American decision to withdraw the loan was a
calculated insult aimed at discrediting Nasser and all other
neutrals that attempted to blackmail the West. By this
action, Dulles and Eden seemed to think they could cut the
power structure out from underneath the Egyptian leader.
This, however, did not get a chance to materialize, because
Nasser quickly countered the Western move by taking the ob-
vious course of action. He seized the Canal on July 26, 1956,
and thus threatened the oil supply to Western Europe.
In carrying out the plan to nationalize the Canal,
Egyptian security police, armed with the Nationalization de-
cree, "took over ~e headquarters of the Canal Company, and
informed its employees - mainly British and French - that if
they refused to carryon working they would be liable to
1prison sentences from three to fifteen years."
lJohnson, Suez War, p. 8.
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That night, to a massed throng in Alexandria, Nasser announced
the news of his decision to the Egyptian people. The text of
his statement was that he had ordered that the Universal Com-
pany of the Suez Maritime Canal, be nationalized. It was an
Egyptian joint stock company and had been chartered under
Egyptian Law, thus giving him every right to do it. Further-
more, all Jrofits from the company, and its operation of the
DanaI, would be used to build the Aswan High Dam. He further
stated that Egypt would move forward despite the intrigues
and double talk from the Americans; ending the tirade against
the United States withdrawal of aid with this statement:
"Whenever I hear talk from Washington, I shall say, 'Die of
your furyl,."2
The nationalization of the Suez Canal, by Nasser, while
acceptable under international law as a basic right of a
sovereign nation, if just compensation was made to those in-
volved, brought immediate reaction from the Western powers.
The next day, the Department of State released this statement
to the Press:
The announcement by the Egyptian Government
on July 26 with respect to the seizure of the
installations of the Suez Canal Company carries
far reaching implications. It affects the nations
whose economies depend upon the products which
move through this international waterway and the
maritime countries as well as the owners of the
2U.S. Department of State, The Suez Canal Problem-July
26-September 22, 1956 (Documentary Publication No. 6392,
October, 1956), p. 29. Cited hereafter, Department of State,
S.C.P.
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Company itself. The United States Government
is consultlng urgently with other governments
concerned.j
While this statement is somewhat obscure, conce~ning the
American position, Richard Nixon, then Vice President, wrote
later: "Whatever one may think of Premier Nasser's right to
Egyptianize the Suez Canal- • • • our government has not
disputed his right- ••••n4
The United States then lodged a formal protest with the
Egyptian Ambassador, concerning the tone and content of
President Nasser's statements affecting the United States -
Egyptian relations. It stated that:
• • • entirely apart from the question of the
seizure by Egypt of the installations of the
Suez Canal concerning which the Department had
made a statement on July 27, the United States
Government was shocked by the many intemperate,
inaccurate and misleading statements made with
respect to the United States by the President
of Egypt during the past few days, and partic-
ularly in his Alexandria speech delivered on July
26. He pointed out that such statements were
entirely inconsistent with the friendly rela-
tions which had existed between the two Govern-
ments and peoples, and were alien to the frank and
cordial relationships which have prevailed among
American and Egyptian officials. 5
The reason for such an innocuous statement, by the State De-
partment, at this time, on such a crucial matter, was that
the President, now full recovered from his stroke and preparing
4Richard Nixonr The Challenges We Face (New York: McGrawHill Book Company, 960), p. 74. Cited hereafter, Nixon,
Challenges.
5Department of State, S.C.P., press release No. 414, p. 33.
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for re-election, and the Secretary of State were on a trip
through South America. It would not be until July 29 that
a statement of the administration's policy would be made.
Mr. Dulles stated:
I have been particularly concerned with the
Egyptian action in purporting to nationalize the
Suez Canal Company. Such action strikes a griev-
ous blow at international confidence. This action
could affect not merely the shareholders, who, so
far as I know, are not American, but it could
affect the operation of the Canal itself. That
would be a matter of deep concern to tbe United
States as one of the maritime nations.6 .
The New York Times was led to speculate if Egypt would
get away with the dramatic and vengeful seizure of the foreign-
operated waterway.7
The attack by Nasser had been aimed essentially at the
United States, but the seizure of the Canal and Company had
a greater effect on the nations of Western Europe than it did
on the United States, and their reaction was much stronger
and more urgent than was America's.
Prime Minister Eden dispatched a telegram, Qn the day of
the announced seizure, stating that: na man with Colonel Nasser's
record could not be allowed 'to have his thumb on our wind-
pipe,.n8 Eden recorded in his memoirs:
The Government considered the situation fully
that Friday morning and decided that they could not
6Ibid ., p. 34.
70sgood Caruthers, nNasser's Bold Plans Link Canal and
Dam," New York Times, July 29, 1956, p. E5.
8Eden , Full Circle, p. 474.
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allow asser to seize control of the canal in
defiance of international agreements. The canal
was an international asset and had been recog-
nized as such ever since the Convention of 1888.
In recent years its importance had been greatly
increased by the development of the Middle Eastern
oil fields and by the dependence of Western Europe on
them for a large part of its oil supplies • • • •
The Government determined that our essential in-
terests in this area must be safeguarded, if neces-
sary by military action, and that the needful pre-
parations must be made. Failure to keep the canal
international would inevitably lead to the loss
one by one of all our interests and assets in the
Middle East, and even if Her Majesty's Government
had to act alone they could not stop short of using
force to protect their position.9
In France, a nation already at war with the Arab world
in Algeria, Nasser's seizure offered the excuse the French
Government needed to open a campaign of retribution against
the man and country they believed were responsible for both
arming and directing the Algerian rebels in their quest for
independence. 10
Thus, France and Britain, for different reasons, held
similar aims. Neither was ready to act alone, without first
consulting the Americans. They therefore called a meeting of
the three powers in London, lito discuss the situation and align
a joint policy" as Sir Anthony put it. ll Eden sent the fol-
lowing message to Eisenhower, in part it said:
The ultimate threat is to the oil supplies
to Western Europe, a great part of which flows
through the canal • • • •
9Ibid., p. 474-475.
10Johnson, Suez War, p. 42.
IlEden, Full Circle, p. 475.
It is, however, the outlook for the longer
terms which is more threatening. The canal is
an international asset and facility, which is
vital to the free world • • • •
We should npt allow ourselves to become in-
volved in legal qUibbles about the rights of the
Egyptian Government to nationalize what is tech-
nically an EgYPtian company, or in financial argu-
ments about their companyw pay the compensation
which they have offered. I feel sure that we
should take issue with Nasser on the broader in-
ternational grounds.
As we see it we are unlikely to attain our
objectives by economic pressures alone • • • •
We ought in the first instance to bring the max-
imum political pressure to bear on Egypt • • • •
My colleagues and I are convinced that we must
be ready, in the last resort, to use force to
bring Nasser to his senses. For our part we are
prepared to do so • • • •
However, the first step must be for you and
us and France to exchange views, align our pol-
icies and concert together how we can best bring thelmaximum pressure to bear on the Egyptian Government. 2
This was a strong statement, considering it was issued one day
after Nasser's announced seizure, and only two weeks after
the last British troops had been withdrawn from Suez.
The British threat to use force and its possible conse-
quences however, must not have alarmed Mr. Dulles perceptively,
because he sent Deputy Under Secretary of State, Robert
Murphy, to London, to represent the United States in talks
with Britain's Foreign Secretary, S. Lloyd, and the French
Foreign Minister, M. Pineau.
Perhaps Secretary Dulles was not overly worried about
121Qig., p. 476-477.
the exped1-
A fact Eden
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immediate Anglo-French action because American intelligence
knew that Britain and France could not undertake such an
operation, because in order to land sufficient forces. in
taeir present military condition, would require
tion to swim from Malta, a thousand miles away.
readily admits in his Memoirs. l3
Dulles did not arrive in London until August 1, two days
after the talks began, and he immediately made it plain that
the American approach would be a legal and moral one. The
European allies had already received reports from their am-
bassadors in Washington, that the State Department was cool
and hesitant about taking urgent action. Mr. Dulles' arrival,
and early statement, quiekly verified this for the allies.
To Eden, to would confirm his worst fears about America's re-
action, of moral and legal pressures, -being brought against
Colonel Nasser, in practice meant conferences and resolutions,
but no action. The result would be words.-14
The resulting action, of the three power Lo~don talks,
ended with a Tripartite Statement, which was issued on August
2, 1956. It stated that while the governments involved recog-
nized the action taken by the government of Egypt, as a legal
right of an independent nation, they nevertheless viewed such
an action as more serious because of the international impli-
cations of the Canal, and that its seizure threatened the
l3Ibid., p. 479.
l4Ibid., p. 482.
freedom of passage as guar~'teed by the Convention of 1888.
They concluded by recommending that the Canal be under an in-
ternational arrangement for its operation, designed to assure
the continuity of its operation. To this end they proposed a
conference be held of parties to the 1888 Convention and other
nations largely concerned with the use of the Canal. The Con-
ference, to be held in London, would begin on August 16, 1956. 15
An interesting sidelight to the American approach is
cited by Eden, in that the United States, while stressing the
international flavor of the Suez Canal, kept referring to the
American control of the Panama Canal, as a private matter,
and entirely different because it was between the United States
and Panama; the United States Government was determined to
keep it so. The French, on the other hand, had built the Suez
Canal and had just as much of a privileged position as had
the United States in Panama. France demanded immediate com-
bined action because the real source of the problem lay with
the retaliation by Nasser, against the American refusal to
finance the Aswan Dam. Dulles did not believe this to be the
case.16
In a report to the nation, on his return, Secretary
Dulles made quite clear the reasons he felt Nasser had seized
the Canal. He stated that he thought the nationalization
had taken place to enhance the prestige of Egypt, and extend
15Department of State, S.C.P., p. 34.
16Eden , Full Circle, p. 485-486.
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Nasser's influence from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf.
The overt act was done in retaliation for the withdrawal of
Anglo-American aid and as a blow against Western imperialism.
He further stated, that it was inadmisable that a waterway,
internationalized by treaty, should be exploited for the self-
ish aims of one country. The question of the problem was
therefore not whether something should be done, but what should
be done. Mr. Dulles, in his report, then went on to explain
about the proposed London Conference of twenty~four nations.
The twenty-four nations, to consist of three groups, would
have eight in each group. The original eight of the 1888
Treaty, which included Egypt and the Soviet Union, the second
group of eight included the nations who own the greatest vol-
ume of traffic that uses the Canal, and the third group of
eight, nations which were dependent on the canal. It was
Dulles' hope that the conference would settle the dispute
peacefully. 17
President Eisenhower reiterated Secretary Dulles' state-
ments of the international importance of the Canal, by liken-
ing it to an international public utility.lS
On Sunday, August 12, Eisenhower called a bipartisan
meeting of the Congressional leaders to the White House, to
discuss the Suez situation. His opening remark was that Nasser
had announced he would not attend the London conference.
l7Department of State, S.C.P., p. 37-42
l8Adams , Report, p. 250.
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This would mean little liklihood of a peaceful solution to
the problem. Dulles then explained to the Congressional
leaders how difficult it had been to check the Anglo-French
demands for military action. He explained that he held them
back by warning them that world opinion would be against them
and would be regarded as a violation of the United Nations
charter. But, he stressed to the gathered leaders, he shared
the same view that Britain and France held about Nasser, that
he intended to unite the Middle East against the West. His
final statement put the cards on the table: "They (Britain
and France) have only agreed to bide their time until the con-
ference. They 'call Nasser a wild man brandishing an ax.,,19
While Eisenhower and Dulles were informing the Congres-
sional leaders on the gravity of the situation, in Washington,
President Nasser was explaining why Egypt would not attend
the London parley. In making a statement to this effect,
President Nasser declared:
It is clear that the three Governments who
issued the joint statement persist in alleging
that the Suez Canal Company is an international
agency and the Egyptian Government cannot change
its character.
This ignores all the treaties and agreements
which say that the Suez Canal Company is an
Egyptian Company governed by Egyptian Law and
also ignores the fact that the Egyptian Govern-
ment will take over the administration of the
canal when the Suez Canal Company agreement
runs out.
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It also ignores the fact that the canal is
an inseparable part of Egypt • • • • The interna-
tionalization of the canal by the Egyptian Gov-
ernment in accordance with its sovereignty and
any attempt to give the Suez Canal Company inter-
national status is merely an excuse to interfere
in Egypt's internal affairs. 20
The Egyptian refusal to attend the conference makes it
difficult to understmdwhy the conference was held, since no
agreements could be reached without Egypt's approval. It is
also strange that from the inception of the problem, the
British and the French did not go to the United Nations, for
a remedy to the situation, nor did the United States press
for this action. One explanation, given by President Eisen-
hower, and quoted by his aide Sherman Adams, is that because
of the French and British veto power, in the Security Council,
and the possibility of a long and drawn-out debate before the
General Assembly, the United Nations would be ineffective. 21
This may have been the reason, but another one that must
have entered into the thinking of the State Department was
that the recent addition of many newly emergent ~ations to
the United Nations, could upset the balance of power in the
General Assembly, which the Atlantic partnership had controlled
since its inception. Many of these nations, it must have been
felt, were so strongly nationalistic that they would like
nothing better than to get back at the colonial powers. This
is supposed to most closely represent the thinking of Mr. Dulles
20Deparunent of State, S.C.P., p. 49.
21Ad~~s, Report, p. 251.
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on the matter of the United Nations and the Crisis. 22
The Conference opened, as scheduled, on August 15 in
London. Of the nations invited, all accepted - except for
gypt. Most of the nations that arrived had an economic in-
terest in the Canal and were anxious to see that it was well
administered. By August 22, the business of the Conference
was all but finally completed. During the course of the
meetings three different proposals had been advanced, for re-
solving the dispute. The first idea was presented by Secretary
Dulles; it asserted the principle of international control
over the Canal, while recognizing the sovereign rights of
Egypt and guaranteed her a fair share for the use of the Canal
and proposed the negotiation of a new convention. The new
convention would provide for an international board to operate
the Canal and arbitrate disputes, in association with the
United Nations. 23 Spain then produced a compromise plan, that
suggested a joint Egyptian-international board and a separate
court of appeals for disputes. India submitted an alternate
plan, it provided for an international advisory board, a new
version of the Convention, which Egypt would be required to
sign and would be made subject to United Nations sanctions.
When the three plans were finally brought to a vote,
22Johnson, Suez War, p. 53-54.
23Eden , Full Circle, p. 303.
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eighteen nations voted for the American plan,24 Spain for
her O\tn and India, Russia, Ceylon, and Indonesia voted for
the Indian plan. 25 The conference then chose a committee of
representatives to present to the Egyptian Government the
decisions that it had reached; to explain the purpose and ob-
jectives of the proposal and to find out if Nasser would be
willing to negotiate a convention onthis basis.
Secretary Dulles returned to Washington on August 25 and
made this statement: "The London Conference on the Suez
Canal set in motion processes designed to lead to a fair and
peaceful solution of the grave problems raised by the actions
of the Egyptian Government ••••n26
President Nasser responded to these proposals of the
London conferees, by rejecting them flatly. In doing so,
President Nasser restated his position that the Suez Canal
and Company were an integral part of Egypt and he refused to
allow &1Y internationalization of them. He further added that
the Government of Egypt had not violated any of its interna-
tional obligations concerning the Canal, and in spite of the
difficulties created by France and Britain, the Canal had
continued to operate with regularity and efficiency. He then
24The eighteen nations were: Australia, Denmark, Ethiopia,
France, West Germany, Iran, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States.
25Johnson, Suez ar, p. 62.
26Department of State, S.C.P., p. 295.
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offered this added clause:
The crisis and the so-called 'grave situ-
ation' are therefore artificially created by the
above mentioned quarters ~rance and Britai~
as witness, among other things:
a)
b)
c)
d)
Statements containing threats of force
Mobilization and movement of troops by
France and the United Kingdom;
Inciting employees and pilots working
in the Suez Canal to abruptly abandon
their work, by France and the United
Kingdom and some officials of the
former Suez Canal Company;
and
Hostile economic measures taken against
~gypt.27
Nasser then proposed another conference of his own which
received little attention in ashington and none in London or
Paris. The British and French by this time had had time to
make the necessary military build up and preparations for
the course of action they must have chosen. The British and
French were apparently convinced that Nasser was another
Hitler and his grab of the Canal was Hitler reoccupying the
Rhineland allover again. 28
France devised a new operation to bring Egypt to its
knees. It called for British and French ship-pilots to
quit their jobs in the Canal zone. Without these pilots,
it was felt Egypt would be unable to operate the Canal and
this would provide Britain and France with an excuse for
military action. The combined Anglo-French invasion force
27Department of State, S.C.P., p. 318.
28Robe~tson, Crisis, p. 88.
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had by this time been readied for action and D-day was
drawing near. Secretary Dulles was becoming suspicious
of their actions. He knew they had had a military build-
up on Cyprus and he feared that France and Britain might
go it alone. If so, he would have to stop them because the
Eisenhower administration had come to power in 1952 on a
peace policy, and election day was only a few weeks away.29
President Eisenhower had already stated in a press con-
ference, on September 11, that the United States would not
go to war or use any force under the present conditions.
Mr. Dulles must have then concluded that he would have to
dissuade France and Britain from taking any military action.
His best way to do that would be to alleviate their fears by
an attractive alternative. Therefore, Dulles suggested to
his allies a Suez Canal Users' Club. It was a new approach,
based on the assumption that no new convention was necessary,
since the one of l88S provided all the rights that were re-
quired. Dulles' idea was that the users should club together,
hire the pilots, organize navigation, and manage the canal's
straits themselves. While it would be inconvenient, it
might work and would keep money out of the hands of Nasser.
This action would qUickly deflate the Egyptian leader and
would simply mean using the rights already granted by the
earlier convention. 3D
29Johnson, Suez War, p. 68
30Eden, Full Circle, p. 515-516.
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From the very start of this plan, it does not appear that
it was very clearly worked out, and with the United States
disclaiming itself from, and discouraging its allies from
using force, Nasser', with the backing of Soviet Russia,
thought he had little to fear. Eden wrote of this new pro-
posal that:
The decision whether to endorse the Ameri-
can users' plan was one of the most crucial we
had to face during the whole Suez Crisis. Its
consequences were far-reaching. If we had told
the United States Government that we did not
consider the User' Club a workable proposition
and that we preferred to go direct to the Secu-
rity Council in support of the kind of resolution
we had already shown them, and they had declined
to approve, we would, I suppose, have forefeited,
for the time being at least, something of their
goodwill. On the otherhand, we would have avoided
the long and dismal trail of.negotiations in
which we became involved in an effort to set up
this Users' Club.31
The plan for the Users' Club was another deliberate
attempt by Dulles to stall for time and hope a peaceful
solution to the problem could be found. In a sense a race
was on between, on the one hand the Egyptian GOvernment,
who had seized the Canal and now was forced to recruit per-
sonnel to replace the Company's and, onfue other, the Anglo-
French alliance that had questioned the "theft lf of the Canal,
from the start, and were doing everything possible to show
that Egypt could not handle the responsibility of controlling
the Canal and would not negotiate a settlement.
3I Ibid., p. 536.
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For our allies the race was not going well at all.
The Egyptian Government did not stop ships that refused to
pay the tolls, and British and French ships still paid
their accounts in London and Paris. The American ships
were paying tolls to the Egyptian Government, under pro-
test. By paYing Nasser, they indirectly were supporting
his claims which weakened their allies position. Coupled
with this was Eisenhower's statement which had promoted
and promised a peaceful settlement of the dispute, and had
dashed the diplomatic "eards of influence and intimidation
from the hands of Britain and France."32
The British and French~ for the time being, had no
recourse but to agree to a new conference on the proposed
Users' Association. Both countries realized it kept mat-
ters from coming to a head and doubted it had any intrinsic
value, as far as settling the situation, but above all, Eden
wrote, nit provided a means of working with the United States.
I was prepared to lean over backwards to achieve this."33
While our allies were leaning over backwards to draw
a firm commitment from America (it was hoped the User' As-
sociation might be it), Secretary Dulles began a series of
strange diplomatic maneuvers. It began during a news con-
ference on September 13, when he made a statement that left
the press with the impression that Prime Minister Eden had
32Finer, Dulles, p. 189.
33Eden , Full Circle, p. 534.
formulated the Users' Club plan, and the United States
would participate in such an association. Dulles then
stated that in forming such an association, he hoped it
would get the operating problems out of the hands of the
politicians and statesmen, and turn them over to the prac-
tical ship operators to deal with the practical Egyptian
authorities, in hopes it would solve the problem. When asked
what would happen if Egypt resisted this plan, as she had
already vetoed the first plan, Mr. Dulles replied, again in
devious terms, that if Egypt stopped or prohibited vessels
from going through, then the alternative would be to go
around the Cape, realizing it would involve added cost,
inconvenience, and delay to the users of the Canal. When
they asked if this meant the United States advocated, or
was planning a boycott of the Canal, Dulles replied:
It is not a boycott of the Canal, as far
as I know, to refrain from using force to get
through the C&1al. If force is interposed by
Egypt,. then I do not call it a boycott to avoid
using force to shoot your way through. We do
not intend to shoot our way through. It may be
we have the right to do it, but we don't intend
to do it as far as the United States is concerned. 34
On September 17, '~. Dulles, as he was about to leave
for the London Suez Canal Users' Conference, made this
statement:
We are not trying to orga~ize any boycott
of the Canal but we cannot be blind to the fact
that conditions might become such that transit
34Department of State, S.C.P., p. 340-341.
59
through the Canal is impractical or greatly di-
minished. There must always be ways to assure
the movement of vital supplies, particularly oil,
to Western Europe. Accordingly, we are carrying
out planning as a prudent precaution.35
The Second London Conference began on September 19, amid
wild speculation among the eighteen members convened. No
one really knew what the Users' Association was to mean; some
thought it was to mean that they would club together, reach
an accord, and if Nasser did not agree to it, then they
would shoot their way through the Canal. Others must have
thought it was to work out plans for a boycott, with the
United States footing the bill for its allies, to keep them
from using force. The only person who really must have
known, for sure, was its originator, John Foster Dulles.
Nasser had already made it clear what he thought of the
Users' Association, when he declared:
We shall not allow the ~Testern-proposed
Canal Users' Association to function through
the Canal. ie Egyptians shall run the Canal
smoothly and efficiently and if, in spite of
this, the Canal Users' Association forces its
way through the Suez Canal then it would3~ean
aggression and would be treated as such.
The Users' Association was doomed before it even got
started. The British and the French did not like the delay
and Nasser rejected it before it had even drffi~ up a reso-
lution. America, by its indecision, had been placed in the
most awkward position, of attempting to mediate a problem
35Ibid., p. 351.
36Finer, Dulles, p. 248.
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that the belligerents did not want to mediate. Of the
United States' policy in these affairs, Nasser is quoted
as saying, "Really, the United State"s is a puzzle to me.
I am not able to follow it."3? With such an ominous begin-
ning, the second London Conference became a debating so-
ciety and not as the British and French had conceived it.
They had hoped it would put teeth into the original plan of
internationalizing the canal, but the Suez Canal Users' As-
sociation was loaded with pitfalls. Its membership had no
obligations to the organization as it was conceived, and the
clause defining how dues shall be paid, stated that the sub-
scribing countries, to the Association, may pay the dues to
the Association, but did not commit them to withhold them
from Egypt, which would have been the main reason for form-
ing the Users' Association.
The second Suez Conference, in London, met for only
three days (19-21 September); the only concrete decision
made was that a Users' Association would be established and
provisions for its operation would begin at an early date.
The after-effects of the second London Conference made
it absolutely clear to our European allies that the United
States would not use or condone the use of force to resolve
the situation. To them, the Users' Association made sense,
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only as a means of bringing Nasser to terms, by defying his
company's regulations and taking over the Canal's operations
themselves. 38 Eden wrote: "••• the American conception of
the association was now evolving so fast that it would end
as an agency for collecting dues for Nasser. n39 Therefore,
he continued:
The Egyptian Government showed no readiness
to compromise, though they had at first been ap-
prehensive of the Users' Association. They feared
for a while that it might be really effective. Re-
assur8d on this point, they were content to stand
put. 4
Opinion in Cairo, and elsewhere throughout the world,
was that with the break up of the second London Conference
and the apparent disunity of the Western powers, the crisis
no longer existed. ro England and France, however, the United
States' lack of support left them only a choice between force
and surrender. 4l
Disunity of the West
That Britain and France felt deceived and disillusioned,
following their talks with Secretary Dulles, would be an
understatement. The United States bears a responsibility
for this, because it was unwilling to see the seriousness
of what its allies regarded as a vital issue and a promise
38Campbell, Middle East, p. 103.
39Eden, Full Circle, p. 548.
40Ibid., p. 548.
41Campbell, Middle East, p. 103.
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of a common course of action. If the United States did not
sanction the use of force, it refused to explore other means
of bringing pressure upon Nasser, to come to the bargaining
table. Ins~ead, the United States did not even favor eco-
nomic measures against Egypt, and paid its Canal dues to
the Egyptian authorities. On the other hand, the European
powers, themselves, did not show a great deal of wisdom on
this issue either. They were obsessed with forcing Nasser
into a military showdown, and did not comprehend the strength
of the American moral objectionm this approach. The Europeans
feared, too much, a parallel between Nasser's action and that
of past dictators in Europe and refused to appease him, as
they had in Munich. Thus, the American approach was a world-
wide approach, as viewed in the international scope of East
versus West, whereas the Anglo-French approach was one of
immediate concern to see that Nasser did not become another
Hitler. 42 In any event, communications between Washington
and London-Paris virtually broke down, so far as,the Suez
question was concerned, after the failure of the London
conferences.
While the United States was still reluctant to take the
matter to the United Nations, the failure of the Conferences
to resolve anything, and the fact thattwo months had elapsed
since the Canal had been seized, forced Britain and France
42Ibid., p. 103-104.
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to bring the issue before the Security Council. Dulles, while
unhappy over the Anglo-French decision, did not attempt to
dissuade them. However, the United States Government would
not sponsor the letter sent to the President of the Security
Council, requesting it be put on the agenda. It was to be
an Anglo-French request. 43
The Anglo-French move to put their case before the Secu-
rity Council was done, in hopes that they could get the Canal
out from under the control of a single government or indi-
vidual, and to secure enforceable guarantees for the efficient
management, maintenance, and navigation of the Canal. However,
Eden wrCi>te:
If the securitI Council showed itself in-
capable of maintain. ng international agreements,
• • • we would be prepared to use whatever steps,
including force, might be needed to re-establish
respect for these obligations.44
Eden then telegraphed this message to President Eisenhower:
ttyou. can be sure that we are fully alive to the wider dangers
of the Middle East situation. They can be summed up in one
word - Russia. • • ."45
As the Security Council took up debate on the Crisis,
another curious turn of events took place for United States'
policy. The opening statement by United States Representa-
tive Lodge, in the Security Council was: "The United States
43Eden, Full Circle, p. 550.
44Ibid., p. 554.
45Ibid., p. 555.
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welcomes the initiative which the Governments of the United
Kingdom and France have taken in bringing the Suez Canal mat-
ter to the Security Council for its consideration. n 46
The United N~tions Security Council, on October 13, adopted
a six-point resolution which France, Britain and Egypt publicly
accepted as the agreed basis for a negotiated settlement.
Among the requirements adopted was that tithe operation of the
Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country, tl47
the same concept Egypt had previously refused.
The United States and Secretary Dulles were overly gra-
tified at this apparent progress and awaited direct negotia-
tions between the parties to get under way and finally settle
the dispute. Communications, however, had broken down so
completely, that the Secretary, while gratified by the progress,
evidently was oblivious to the reaction of his European allies
to the Security Council resolution.
Eden wrote in his Memoris:
• • • the notion gained currency that the Secu-
rity Council had prepared the terms for a peaceful
and just settlement of the dispute. Those who
wished to assure themselves that the easy path is
also the wise one, pointed to the six principles,
which all the members of the Council had endorsed.
Six principles, when it had taken us three months
of negotiation to carry practical working proposals
for the future of the Canal to the United Nations,
46Department of State Bulletin, (October 8, 1955), p.
560-561.
47Department of State, United States Policy in the
Middle East, September 19~6-June 1957 (United Nations
Document No. s/3675, Octo er 13, 1956), p. 120.
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only to have them smcthered. At the end of that
time we were to rejoice at being offered six
principles in their place. The truth was starkly
clear to me. Plunder had paid off.4~
nIt is inevitable that there will be a reckoning for this
moral back sliding.,,49
Reckoning Over Suez
"The clouds were lOi''lering and menacing in October 1956.
The storm could not be far ahead. No record of events at
that time can be true which does not take account of this.,,50
In 1950, the United States, France, and Britain had
issued the Tripartite Declaration. Its aim was to maintain
an equilibrium of forces and arms between Israel and the
Arabs, and to safeguard the Armistice lines of Palestine.
The Egyptian arms deal with the Soviet bloc changed all that
and Israel immediately requested arms from the West. The
United States would not sell arms to Israel, but did not
object to France or Britain doing so.51 A small arms race
had quickly developed and Egypt was outdistancingthe Israelis.
This brought to Israel the hard fact that if she 'were to
exist, she would have to fight a preventative war in the very
near future.
48Eden, Full Circle, p. 564.
49Ibid ., p. 565.
50Ibid., p. 574.
51New York Times, "Palestine ChronologyU, July 8, 1956,
ES.
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The crisis over the canal, from which Is-
raeli ships had always been barred, brought out
more clearly the obvious parallel between the
interests of Israel and those of the West in
their common antagonism to Egypt. We cannot be
sure to what extent Israel's leaders thought
they could gain "their own ends by acting as the
cutting edge of Western policy, or to what ex-
tent British and French statesmen saw the advan-
tages in having Israel do, or begin, the job
they wanted done. We can be sure, however, that
some thinking along these lines took place, and
that it led to ever closer relations between
France and Israel and finally to the dovetailed
if not concerted action which marked the o~t­
break of the crisis at the end of October.,2
As the presidential election race turned into the home
stretch, in late October, President Eisenhower began to re-
ceive intelligence reports of a mobilization of military
forces in Israel, far beyond what was employed in border
skirmishes or commando operations. The United States sent
an urgent appeal to David Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister of
Israel, to halt him from taking an action that might renew
fighting in the area. The American appeals carried little
weight, however, because the United States had consistently
refused to supply arms to Israel for her defense. Israel
had received some arms aid from France and Canada, but still
its capacity to resist, deterioriated as Nasser's forces be-
came better equipped with Communist arms.
At the same time, in late October, Communist factions
in Poland and Hungry revolted against Soviet occupation forces.
In H~ngry the revolt became so intense and wide spread that
Russian reinforcements were called in to put the rebellion
52Campbell, Middle East, p. 105.
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down, and restore its puppet regimes to power. President
"Eisenhower could do little but watch the Hungarians suffer
and offer them sympathy, relief and asylum. tt53
hile the United States was caught by surp'ise by the
turn of events in Eastern Europe, Israel's armed forces
attacked Egypt on the Sinai Peninsula.
It seemed obvious that the Israelis had
been encouraged in this spectacular adventure
by the British and the French. Under the terms
of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, the two
Western European powers and the United States
could use direct military force to intervene if
Israel or Egypt broke their peace pact. The
drive by the Israelis toward the canal gave the
British and the French their excuse to invade
Suez.54 .
The British and the French, moving quickly as if by pre-
arranged plan, invoked the Tripartite Declaration, and sent
a~ ultimatum to Tel Aviv and Cairo, calling for both sides
to stop war-like actions and to withdraw ten miles from both
sides of the Canal. The Egyptian Government was also asked
to allow an Anglo-French force to occupy temporarily, key
positions along the Canal. The objective of this. action was
to separate the belligerents and to guarantee freedom of
transit through the Canal for ships of all nations. The over-
all purpose, was of course, to bring hostilities to a~ end
as soon as possible. The ultimatum gave the belligerents
twelve hours to reply and if ignored, British and French
53 Adams, Report, p. 255.
54Ibid ., p. 255.
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troops would go into Suez in whatever strength was thought
necessary. 55
Reaction ~ the United States
The immediate reaction or the United States was to put
the case before the Security Council. But, before the Se-
curity Council could act, it was informed of the ultimatum
delivered by France and Britain to the Governments of Israel
and Egypt. The ultimatum transformed the situation from a
Middle Eastern conflict into a Western attack on Egypt. 56
It was hard for Eisenhower to believe that Britain and
France were in collusion with Israel against Egypt. The
President and Secretary Dulles hastily drafted a resolution
urging all members of the United Nations to refrain from
using force in the Middle East. The British and the French
vetoed this resolution, in the Security Council, and the
break between the United States and her two oldest and closest
allies was completed. The next day, October 31, British and
French bombers attacked Egyptian airfields. The news caught
the President by surprise and it shocked him. He had re-
ceived no previous warning from the British or the French and
had no advance information from American intelligence sources
in Europe or the Mediterranean. 57
55Eden, Full Circle, p. 589.
56Campbell, Middle East, p. 109.
57Adams , Report, p. 255-256•
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In a nationwide address, that same day, President
Eisenhower stated:
As it is the manifest right of any of these
nations to take such decisions and actions, it
is likewise our 'right - if our judgement so dic-
tates - to dissent. We believe these actions to
have been taken in error. For we do not accept
the use of force as a wise or proper instrument
for the settlement of international dispute
• • • •
In the circumstances I have described, there
will be no United States involvement in these
present hostilities. • • •
At the same time it:is - and it will remain -
the dedicated purpose of your government to do
all in its power to localize the fighting and to
end the conflict. • • •
It is, our hope and intent that this matter
will be brought before the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly. There - with no veto operating -
the opinion of the world can be brought to bear
in our quest for a just end to this tormenting
problem. In the past the United Nations has
proved able to find a way to end bloodshed. We
believe it can and that it will do so again.58
Prior to hearing of the Anglo-French attack, the Presi-
dent had conferred with his top military and political ad-
visors, and it was agreed "that if Russia came openly to
Nasser's assistance, a war was inevitable.,,59 The Anglo-
French action changed that policy, because the President
was stunned that our allies had not consulted the United
States, in any way, and angry with them for making such a
Report, p.
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move.
The Presidential address stated the United States would
not become involved and would pursue the moralistic approach,
by·taking the whole matter before the United Nations. But,
what was our position to be if the hostilities continued?
Were veto assist Egypt against Israel, Britain, and France,
if they continued to attack, or were we to pledge flowers
for the funeral of Nasser?60 This, the President did not
toueh on in his speech; he made no policy statement. E. J.
Hughes, one of the President's speech writers, summed up the
reason for this lack of clarity by stating: "The damn trouble
is that we don't have a policy in this crisis, and you can't
try to use a speech as a substitute. n6l
The General Assembly met on the morning of November 2,
and as Sir Anthony Eden remarked: nIt was not Soviet Russia;
or any Arab state, but the Government of the United States
which took the lead in the Assembly against Israel, France and
Britain. n62 The dominant theme of the American reaction to
the crisis was that the combined Anglo-French-Israeli ag-
gressions on Suez, and the Sinai Peninsula, were a direct
violation of the United Nation's Charter. The thought of
6°Emmet John Hughes,Memoir of the Eisenhower ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
p. 21~. Cited hereafter,
6lIbid., p. 217.
62Eden , Full Circle, p. 604.
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our policy represented a determination to end the hostilities
and a withdrawal of invading forces. As presented, this
rather rigid legalistic approach required a return to the
status guo ante, so that no change could be interpreted as
a reward for aggression. 53
The Allied strategy, while taking advantage of Soviet
preoccupations with Hungry and an. election eve atmosphere
in the United States, hoped for a quick military victory and
ousting of Nasser, before anybody could do anything about it.
Their plans were upset, however, by the one factor they had
forgotten to take into account. They underestimated the
ability of the United Nations to take immediate action. If
the United States and the Soviet Union ever cooperated on a
single bit of world legislation, it was on this particular
issue. The result was the General Assembly hastily passed,
overwhelmingly, a series of resolutions calling for a ces-
sation of fighting and the withdrawal of foreign troops from
Egypt.
The Soviets became so carried away with the cooperative
atmosphere of the United States - U.S.S.R. relations, that
they proposed a joint military program to stop the British
and French invasion of Egypt. President Eisenhower quickly
rejected the Soviet proposal as a publicity stunt, to divert
world attention from Soviet action in Hungry, and reminded
63campbell, Middle East, p. 114.
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them that the General Assembly had already called on them to
halt their operations in Hungry. Soviet Premier Bulganin
also sent out letters to France, Britain, and Israel calling
on them to stop hostilities or face the consequences.
The entrance of Soviet threats into the situation changed
the complexity of the problem greatly. For the United States:
• • • the obvious danger existed that Moscow
might be irrisistibly tempted toward aggressive
action, on a massive scale, by both hope and
fear - the hope that Egypt signified a deep
division of the West, and the fear that Hungry
threatened a kind of earthquake within the Soviet
sphere. The combination looked explosive. And
the President described it pithily: • • • 'we may
be dealing here with the opening gambit of an
ultimatum. We have to be positive and clear in
our every word, every step. And if those fellows
start something, we may have to hit 'em - and,
if necessary, with everything in the bucket'.tr64
The situation had become so tense, and the worldwide
stakes so high, "that the crisis could ond only in the flat
terms of a choice between political and personal destinies:
either Nasser must fall - or Eden must fall. n65
Israel's-attackon Egypt had begun on Monday, October
29. By November 6, the combined pressure of the United States
and the Soviet Union, along with the United Nation's resolu-
tions, world opinion, and a general lack of support forced
the Anglo-French forces to call off their assult, with only
Port Said captured, in the drive to occupy the Suez Canal.
64Hughes, Ordeal of Power, p. 22].
65 Ibid ., p. 224.
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Israel, its military objectives accomplished, also called
a halt to its operations. The military reckoning over Suez
had ended, and the arduous task of repairing the damage began.
~ Withdrawal of Foreign Troops
Once the fighting had ceased, it became readily apparent
to all nations concerned that the invasion had solved nothing.
The Suez question was in just as much doubt as it had been
before the invasion, save for the Anglo-French occupation
troops. The situation had been further complicated by the
entrance of the Arab-Israeli war into the overall question.
The Anglo-French-Israeli cease-fire had taken place
for two major reasons: first the fearful pressure from the
United States, and second the promise from the United States,
as the leader of the United Nations,that a United Nations
Emergency Force would be sent to replace their forces as a
means of securing justice for Israel and to the allies in
the Canal dispute. 66
The constructive settlement that Britain, France, and
Israel hoped their actions would bring about, were not forth-
coming after the cease-fire. A stalemate set in, with Bri-
tish, French, and Israeli troops along the Canal ~~aiting
66Finer, Dulles, p. 440.
74
the arrival of the United Nation's Emergency Force. A tense
deadlock followed the cease-fire. The United States demanded
that all advantages gained from the invasion were to be
scrapped. The Allies~ Israel, and Egypt were to discuss their
mutual problems on an equal footing in the United Nations.
Concerning this situation, Eden wrote:
This was the most calamitous of all errors.
Had we expected it to be perpetrated, our course
might have been otherwise, but we could not know.
As it seems to me, the major mistakes were made,
not before the cease-fire or in that decision,
but after it. I did not forsee them. 67
For the United States, on the other hand, the cease-
fire had been a victory for this country and the United
Nations. United States policy makers, including the former
lawyer Dulles, visualized their position as the salvation
of the United Nations' peace keeping mission in the world
and proof that the Rule of Law applied equally to all nations,
friend or foe.
As a practical matter, the United States Government did
not believe that this situation could permanently be solved
by the use of force.
The Administration was also unWilling to let
the Soviet Union reap all the benefits of acting
in their behalf of the Arab peoples in a case like
this in which the aggression was clear. In this way
it had the chance to save some credit for the vest
with the Arabs, now more bitter than ever against
Great Britain and France. 68
67Eden, Full Circle, p. 625.
68campbell, Middle East, p. 110.
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The results for Britain and France were disastrous.
The abortive campaign had failed to accomplish its desired
results. The Canal, which they had gone in to protect, was
closed to all shipping for months, as a result of deliberate
Egyptian actions, that involved scuttling forty ships during
the fighting and shortly after the cease-fire. The oil pipe-
lines, from the Middle East, were cut by the blowing up of
pumping stations in Syria.
The British and French tried desperately to salvage
their claims in the United Nations, and with the United States,
but in vain. The United States had won an important prestige
victory in the Suez Crisis, and it was not willing to sacri-
fice its recently gained Afro-Asian goodwill to take a con-
ciliatory attitude toward its belligerent Allies. Another
factor was, the United States held the economic trump cards
over Britain and France. If they refused to withdraw the
United States could withhold oil supplies from the Western
Hemisphere, and could exert other economic measures that
would stop the dollar flow to Europe.
Our obligations to the United Nations would be upheld
and those who operated outside it would have to pay the con-
sequences. nAs Dulles observed in January, 1957, 'the entry
of Allied troops had been illegal, and it was not proper to
say that they could stay until they had gained certain poli-
tical Objectives,.n69
69Finer, Dulles, p. 444, quoting speeeh by Dulles,
January, 1957.
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As far as the British and French were concerned, their
only course of action was to swallow their pride and resent-
ment and extract themselves, and their troops, as soon as
was possible, from this unfortunate affair.
By Christmas of 1956, British and French troops had been
withdrawn, a United Nations force had taken up positions
eastward from the Canal zone, and the dispute over the Canal
was as far from a solution as ever. Internationalization of
the Canal was dead, and beyond recall.
Nasser's victory, on that issue, discomforted not only
the British and the French, but also the United States, which
had helped him to win it. Israel, for her part, also was
pressured by the United States and the Soviet Union to with-
draw. The difficulty of Israel's decision was based on the
fact that it had won a military campaign, and while it could
not afford to alienate the United States, which was its money
line, Israel needed more assurances for its own existance from
the United Nations, to recognize its particular problem in
the Arab world, before it would withdraw. Secretary Dulles
recognized that special concession would have to be offered
to Israel or the problem of withdrawal would be magnified.
Dulles therefore sent a diplomatic note to Israel, stating
that the United States would pursue a policy within the
United Nations to produce a basis of understanding with re-
gard to the Israeli use of the Gulf of Aqaba and administra-
tion in the Gaza Strip.70 It was not too clear exactly what
III
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these understandings were to be, but it did bring the evacu-
ation and withdrawal that was desired.
With the final withdrawal of Israeli troops, behind the
old armistice line, the crisis may be said to have reached
its end, but the world was no closer to a solution than
when the crisis began. While the problem remained the same,
the participants did change considerably. France and Britain
were ousted completely, leaving the United States as the
sole Western power in the Middle East to protect vital
Western interests there. The United States would have to
play the hand alone in the Middle East, in the future.
The communists began to exploit their new found position,
in the Middle East, by claiming the United States and Israel
had concluded a secret treaty. The challenge from the
Communist world had begun and the American Government had
to redefine its role.
The crisis, of 1956, and the actions of the American
policy which brought about such an ominious out.come, called
for a review of what had happened.
CHAPTER IV
THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS
The immediate after-effects of the Suez incident forced
the United States to adopt a new policy toward the Middle East,
which became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. The need for
this policy, in the wake of the storm, brought a critical
appraisal of Dulles' Suez policy and its results for America's
security and worldwide interests.
The Eisenhower Doctrine
The defeat of the attempt, by Britain and France, to
settle the Suez dispute by military force, destroyed their
prestige and political power in the Middle East. The loss
of Anglo-French influence, in that strategic area, created
what Eisenhower described as a power vacuum. Unless the
United States made clear to the rest of the world its inten-
tion to fill the vacuum, the Soviets could be counted on to
move in and create an intolerable situation for us.
President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles worked out a
plan for protecting the security of the Middle Eastern nations
against Communist aggression. This program became known as
the Eisenhower Doctrine.
In essence, the Doctrine offered to assist any indepen-
dent Arab nation against open Communist aggression and would
provide the President with the authorized power to use
T
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American Armed Forces to insure such protection. It was also
to include a broad economic and military aid program of some
two hundred million dollars to any nation that participated
in the program. l
President Eisenhower threw all his weight behind this
proposal, and addressed Congress on January 5, 1957, on the
importance he placed on such a measure. He stated:
The Middle East has abruptly reached a new
and crucial stage in its long and important
history • • • •
Just recently there have been hostilities
involving Western European nations that once
exercised much influence in the area. Also the
relatively large attack by Israel in October
has intensified the basic differences between
that nation and its Arab neighbors. All this
instability has been heightened and, at times,
manipulated by International Communism.
Russia's rulers have long sought to dominate
the Middle East • • • •
The reason for Russia's interest in the
Middle East is solely that pf power politics.
Considering her announced purpose of Communizing
the world, it is easy to understand her hope of
dominating the Middle East. 2 .
The President then asked Congress to approve his request for
the authority to use armed forces in the Middle East and to
provide funds to strengthen Middle Eastern countries, since
words alone were not enough. 3
IAdams, Report, p. 271.
2Department of State, U.S. Policy in the Middle East,
September 1956-June 1957, p. 16.
3Adams, Report, p. 272-273.
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The Eisenhower Doctrine ran into rough going
in the Senate after being passed in the House with-
out any difficulty • • • • many Democratic and
several Republican Senators felt that the Presi-
dent's request for Congressional support in the
possible use of military force during an indefinite
future emergency was merely &~ attempt to make
Congress share the responsibility for a decision
that belonged to him , • • • There was also the
natural resentment of the supporters of Israel
against courtship of the Arab nations, ••••
Critics also pointed out that the Eisenhower
Doctrine did nothing about such immediate Middle
Eastern problenls as the continued dispute between
Egypt and Israel and the working out of a permanent
agreement with ~gypt over the use of the Suez Canal,
which at that time was still blocked and un-
usable.4
The decision on the Eisenhower Doctrine rested in the
Senate where a strong anti-Dulles faction began a critical
analysis of the Administration's actions during the past few
months, and by using the guise of finding out more infor-
mation about the ramifications of the Eisenhower Doctrine;
indirectly they attacked the competance and character of
Secretary Dulles.
Criticism of Dulles
Senator Fulbright, during special Senate hearings on
the President's Middle East Proposal, demanded that Secretary
Dulles justify his whole past record of policy in the Middle
East. While the Secretary was preparing an answer for that,
Adai Stevenson, with biting wit in commenting on the power
vacuum remarked, "the first vacuum that should be filled
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is in the State Department and not in the ~iddle East. n5
Dulles had run into a full storm of criticism from cer-
tain Senators and it fell to him to argue the case in detail
for the new Doctrine against a critical reaction. Influen-
tial Republica~ voices joined in the critical attacks on the
Secretary of State, stating that he had lost the confidence
of Congress and our allies. When asked by reporters if they
[Senator~ expected to force Dulles to resign, Senator
Fulbright proclaimed that Dulles had "outlived his useful-
6
ness."
For months after Suez, Dulles did little to retrieve
his position. To his closest friends he never revealed any
doubt as to the rightness of the policy he had pursued. He
remained alert to the criticism of his actions, but resisted
attacks on his basic beliefs.7
The Senate even went so far as to send its own fact-
finding committee to the Middle East, headed by Senator
Hubert H. Humphrey. The overall conclusion of this committee
was:
The foreign policy of the United States has
failed to keep pace with our obligations and re-
sponsibilities in the Middle East. In an area of
the utmos~ strategic importance to ourselves and
5Richard Goold-Adams, John Foster Dulles: A Reappraisal
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962), p. 241. Cited
hereafter, Goold-Ad~ns, John Foster Dulles.
6Drummond and Coblentz, Duel at the Brink, p. 190.
7Ibid., p. 190.
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our allies, we have for too long pursued a policy
of drift and improvisation. ·~e have confused
our ~rie~ds, and we have not retarded our
enem~es.8
~llien asked to comment on the personal attacks made against
him, Secretary Dulles remarked that he did not believe that
these attacks were any more than is traditional in American
politics. He defended the stand he took on Suez, by claiming
it was an honorable and sound position that would be justified
by history. He reiterated his beliefs that the world had to
be ruled by one Law for both friend and foe alike. 9
During this period, Dulles had only one source of
strength and support. It came from the President. He pos-
sibly could not have survived without it. The President used
his press conferences to demonstrate his support and confidence
in Mr. Dulles. He continued to insist, that in his opinion,
Secretary Dulles was a Secretary of supreme rank among
American Secretaries of State. Thus, the President placed
his own prestige around Dulles and pulled him through his
blackest moments. lO
Eventually, after two months of debate and strong oppo-
sition, the Eisenhower Doctrine was approved in the Senate
8U•S• Senate, Report of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey on
a Study [ission: The Middle East and Southern Europe. 85th
Cong., 1st. Sess., 1957, p. 1.
9Department of State, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle
ast, p. 41.
lODrummond and Coblentz, Duel at the Brink, p. 191.
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by a substantial margin of seventy-two to nineteen.
In the long view, the Eisenhower Doctrine may not have
been of any great importance, but it was a statement by the
American Government, that it was going to make its presence
felt in the Middle East.
The French and the British were to get a certain satis-
faction from the fact that so soon after forcing them out
for intervention, the United States was forced to proclaim
a doctrine of unilateral intervention of its o~m. It was,
in their opinion, a vindication of their actions in the Suez.
While the Eisenhower Doctrine in itself formulated a
policy for the Middle East, the United States was also forced
to undertake to restore the unity of the Western alliance
in the face of events that had transpired. The United States
had deserted its allies and would now have to face the world-
wide ramifications of following such a policy.
Worldwide Aftermath
Throughout the world there was a universal bewilder-
ment and dismay about the Anglo-French adventure in Egypt.
It was incomprehensible how statesmen of such magnitude as
Sir Anthony Eden and M. Guy Mollet could have brought them-
selves to resort to force, in violation of the United Nations
Charter.
What they had hoped to gain from such actions, and why
did they abandon the acts of diplomacy and negotiation, to
resort to brute force? This being an act which enraged
their allies and dishonored their obligations. ll
The mood of our European allies before, during and
after seems to have been one of frustration. Frustration,
that with all their greatness md past glory, together
they could not succeed once they had adopted a plan of
operation. As they claimed, the United States vacillated
in its policy towards the Middle East, they too changed their
course inmid-stream more than once themselves.
Nevertheless, the aftermath brought a general anti-
American feeling into Britain and France, a feeling based
principally on injured pride, more than actual losses. In
other parts of the world, America enjoyed a new found po-
sition for its moralistic views of equality under the law.
The United States had championed a policy, which for years
was one of the basic tenets of our democracy. This new
found respect was short lived, however, because during the
months that followed the crisis, the American Goyernment was
forced to dispatch troops to the Middle East to prevent a
Communist take over. The Eisenhower Doctrine, which was
hoped to improve our position in the Iiiddle East, was bit-
terly assailed by President Nasser as an attempt to chIDlge
one colonial master for another. "The vaunted rise in Ameri-
can prestige in the Middle East, expected by Dulles and
IIJohnson, Suez War, from introduction by Aneurin Bevin.
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State Department officials as a reward for the Administra-
tion's ep~ity towards their allies' attack on Suez was
dissipated. nlZ
The after effects for the United States have been more
tumultious than the actual crisis, because nothing had been
settled.
The United States and the United Nations, it may be con-
cluded, acted somewhat like the Congress of Vienna in attempt-
ing to re-establish the status quo without resolving the
underlying problems that had precipitated the crisis.
To Israel, Ben-Gurion wrote to President Eisenhower, the
results of the situation, in spite of American promises,
still leaves the sword of Damocles hanging over Israels' head.
To Egypt, smug with the realization that victory was
theirs, through the efforts of American policy decisions,
it was the dawn of a new day for pan-arabism, but the Eisen-
hower Doctrine, the Baghdad Pact, and the Israeli problem
brought a general disillusionment with United States policies
that claimed impartiality between two million Jews and
forty million Arabs.
The overall after effect, however, was that the Atlantic
Alliance was devitalized. Suez tore ATO apart and it has
never been possible to fully restore its corporate morale.
Its core of Britain and France were disenchanted with America
lZFiner, Dulles, p. 501.
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and with one another. Furthermore,
The Suez War, in which both Britain and
France withdrew in the face of American pres-
sure and oblique Soviet threats to drop bombs
on London and Paris, strengthened both govern-
ments' cases for building independent strategic
nuclear forces.~3
Britain, because of a special closeness with the United
States, did receive advances in its nuclear technology in
the aftermath, which drove France, lacking American assis-
tance, away from the Anglo-American allaince toward a
closer alliance with other members of the Common Market.
Secretary Dulles attempted to stop this drift of France, away
from the United States, but was unsuccessful in doing so,
especially in the light of present day relations between the
United States and France.
The lessons of Suez, for Britain and France, were only
too clear, without the United States behind them, and without
their own nuclear striking fore" Europe as a whole was sub-
ject to Soviet nuclear blackmail. Suez had been a traumatic
experience and a realization came over British and French
leaders as to just how vulnerable they were to nuclear attack.
This realization of weakness has taken two forms: first, that
both Britain and France are now junior partners in the world
arenas and secondly, that the two leaders of the world are
the nuclear powers, Russia and the United States. The latter
13Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 21$.
Cited hereafter, Osgood, NATO.
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feeling has had a profound effect upon mmlY European nations,
especially because it has brought the fact to mind that the
course of world events is now controlled by two nations and
if that be the case then why should they be involved at all.
Thus, one of the major forces in the post Suez Crisis
events in Europe has beenthe rise of pacifism, ban the bomb
programs, and talks of neutrality, all of which could, if
implemented, deal a death blow to the Atlantic Alliance.
The weakening of ~ATO, by America deserting her allies,
was a big price to pay in the worldwide struggle with Com-
munism, to satisfy the righteousness concerning the rule
of law.
Upon leaving office, Anthony Eden wrote:
• • • the aftermath of Suez would justify our
policy and do so soon • • • • Further inter-
vention would be inevitable in some part of
the 11iddle East, certainly by ourselves and
possibly by the Americans. I wanted to be
there when that happened. 15
It should be noted that in July, 1958, British and Ameri-
can forces landed in the Middle East. American in Lebanon,
British in Jordon.
The aftermath left strained relations among the Atlantic
partners and presented new and more difficult problems for
the United States because since the alienation of the allies,
there has not been a revival of the cooperative spirit or
trust and unity that held firm in Berlin or Korea.
15Eden, Full Circle, p. 652.
If,in the light of past events, we know that the Suez
operation opened the Middle East for Communist penetration,
its still greater ramification is that it drove a wedge
into an alliance that· is still recovering from its after
effects.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
During the course of this thesis, the writer has attempted
to present a rounded approach to the American involvement,
from both sides of the question. While no definite conclusions
can be reached without hearing from the American diplomat
that carried out the policy of the United States, much must
be left to conjecture and personal beliefs.
Summary
No conclusion could begin without recalling to mind the
more important fascets of the problem, which have been pre-
sented. The first is that Secretary Dulles, serving in a
Republican Administration, inherited the problem of no es-
tablished Middle Eastern policy from his Democratic prede-
cessors. His first step was to declare the United States
impartial in the established feud between Israe~ and the
Arab states. He then attempted to establish a policy in the
Middle East, based on an alliance of those nations closest
to the Soviet borders. It was called the northern tier
alliance and later the Baghdad Pact. At the same time he
attempted to satisfy our desires to see Egypt join the
alliance, and Egypt's desire to oust foreign troops from her
soil. In 1954, Dulles engineered a treaty to do just that
between Britain and Egypt.
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When Egypt concluded an arms treaty with the Soviet
bloc in 1955, Dulles made a serious miscalculation. He con-
tinued his plan to woo Egypt's Nasser, by baiting him with
aid for the Aswan High Dam. This was a serious mistake be-
cause it let Nasser think he could succeed by playing one
side against the other. This did not work long because Dulles
pulled America out of the see-saw battle. Nasser's reaction,
however, while aimed at the United States, hurt our allies;
France and Britain.
Britain and Fr~ce immediately wanted to show the petty
dictator of Egypt a lesson, but Dulles prevailed upon them
to call a new Convention to recognize the international
status of the Canal. This, Dulles in brillant diplomatic
terms, was able to do, but Nass~r rejected it. Again Britain
and France w&1ted to use force, and again Dulles stopped
them by proposing a Canal Users' Association, a hastily con-
ceived plan that did effectively provide more time for a
cooling off period, during which Dulles hoped Britain and
France would forego their aggressive tendencies. This was
not the case.
The entire issue finally was taken to the Security
Council ~ the United Nations, where nothing was resolved.
Meanwhile, events external to ~he nationalization crisis
brought a turn of events to the issue. A revolt broke out
in Hungry against Soviet domination of that country, while
in the United States the final and critical stages of an
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election campaign were closing rapidly. Using world pre-
occupation with other events, Israel invaded Egypt, in what
was termed a preventative measure. France and Great Britain
then attempted to use' the same preoccupation to carry out
their own aims. The result was a poorly staged military
campaign, and a resounding condemnation of the Anglo-French-
Israeli aggression, by the United Nations, the United States
included.
Britain, France, and Israel had gambled that the pre-
occupations would enable them to succeed before anything
could be done, and they gambled wrong. The result was that
all three nations were branded aggressors, and forced, by
world opinions and direct threats from Russia and the United
States, to withdraw.
For all practical purposes, the crisis, as such, was
ended with a lot ventured and nothing gained, especially in
respect to the primary question of the control of the Suez
Canal, and the intruding problem of Palestine.
The aftermath, however, found a villain, a scapegoat,
his name, John Foster Dulles, the sixty-first American
Secretary of State. Dulles was charged with gross incompetence
and a lack of understanding of worldwide problems, but his
President kept him on the job. To Dulles was entrusted the
job of rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance and stopping the
Communist penetration of the Middle East.
Dulles withstood the assult upon his character and
dispatched his duties as he saw fit, being personally
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responsible for helping to formulate the Eisenhower Doctrine,
the first real Middle Eastern policy this country tried to
pursue. The effects of the Doctrine were never felt, how-
ever, due to the untimely death of the Secretary. Thus all
evaluations and conclusions on the American position and in-
volvement are left to the speculator in ifs and buts, and
the true story may never be knoWl1.
@onclusion
One immutable thought remains after completing this
research. The United States chose the proper course to follow
during the Suez Crisis.
The State Department, and its Secretary, John Foster
Dulles, pursued a policy throughout the course of the crisis
that was in keeping with the basic tenets of the hnerican
democracy. It is indeed unfortunate that in doing so, it
alienated our allies, Britain and France.
Much has been written of how the United Sta~es deserted
its allies in their time of need and did not fully appreciate
the vital importance of the Suez Canal as it influenced the
economies of Britain and France. These concepts are unsound
since, in fact, Britain and France deviated from what they
knew was the actual position of the United States who could
more fully appreciate the importance of Suez to Western ~~rope's
economy than the nation that was responsible for their remark-
able growth after World War II. The truth of the matter is
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that Britain and France, from the outset, were going to re-
sort to force to re-establish their position in the Middle
East, but found it militarily expedient to negotiate while
they gathered their forces. Surely the Department of State
must have realized this, and for that reason was necessarily
vague in its approach, in an attempt to stall for time and
a peaceful solution.
The actual turn of events, however, could not be foreseen,
for as we spent our energies in Paris and London, the Arab-
Israeli dispute erupted and afforded Britain and France the
opportunity for direct action. The United States policy,
and particularly its Secretary of State, were not without
fault in this complex situation. The State Department, under
Dulles, was never in full accord. with its Western allies, and
this was based essentially on the puritanical view ~~. Dulles
held on colonialism, leaving him always suspicious of their
every action. He was never sure if they were acting as anti-
communist nations or colonial powers, whose enmi~y he had
felt during his trip tnrough the Middle East. Parallel to
his mistrust of the allies, was Dulles' failure to recognize
any merits in neutrality, which he condemned with equal fervor
as he condemned colonialism. But, he, himself, pursued aD
impartial program in the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Thus, our foreign policy was anti-communist, anti-
colonial, and anti-neutral, all at the same time, which left
little room for allies among the nations of the world. It
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is no wonder that ~~. Dulles became a controversial figure,
whose merits as Secretary of State are often questioned.
In the final analysis, however, for the purposes of
this study, the fact that the aftermath of the crisis has
had more lasting effect, does not invalidate the policy which
America followed during the crisis. In spite of its faults,
it was an honorable and just position to take and proved to
the whole world that the United States believed in its credo,
"with liberty and justice for all. tf
r---------~--------------
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